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THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE DECISIONMAKING
PROCESS REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE:
THE COLD WAR AND BEYOND
Thomas Greven, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1994
Employing Alexander George's method of structured, focused comparison of
cases, this study identifies patterns of Congressional action when the use of American
armed forces was at stake. Common explanations for the reluctance of Congress in
assuming its constitutional role in the initiation of armed conflicts stress concerns over
political costs of a Congressional involvement, namely the so called rally-effect, and
existing policy consensuses.
Operating with a set of variables: the military operation, party control, the
President's behavior toward Congress, and public opinion, which are applied to three
case studies: the Dien Bien Phu crisis in 1954, the airstrikes against Libya in 1986,
and the Persian Gulf War in 1990 and 1991, the study finds that the President's
behavior towards Congress determined the impact of other factors.

Cooperative

behavior of the President enabled Congresspersons to become active, to make
themselves heard in the decisionmaking process. Non-cooperative behavior magnified
the rally-effect and the effects of policy consensuses.
The findings are used to show deficiencies of theories of Congressional action
and of the liberal approach to international relations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Research Problem and Its Relevance
The Cold War and Beyond
The end of the Cold War has caused Americans to reappraise their global
posture. For a considerable time now, the world's leading power has been debating
its role in a post Cold War world. Among the principal uncertainties for American
foreign policy is the question "when is it appropriate to use military force?"
Moreover, the normative and analytical dimensions of this problem impact on, and
therefore require a reexamination of those American political institutions primarily
concerned with authorizing the use of force.
The study presented here examines the role of Congress in decisionmaking
processes when American military force was employed following the end of the
Second World War. It includes cases from the Cold War and after. Three reasons
mainly account for this research focus. First, although many scholars have comment
ed on the failure of Congress to play a decisive role in foreign policy in general and
in warmaking in particular, a comprehensive theory on this matter has not yet been
developed (see Chapter IV). Second, examining the role of the legislature in instances
where the use of military force is at stake may help to clarify and refine the liberal
1
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approach to international relations theory (see below). Third, in the light of the
ongoing debate on redefining American foreign policy, the study has a normative
component: how can effective mechanisms of control over executive decisionmakers
concerning the use of military force be established? The participation of democrat
ically elected legislators in these decisions is one of the key factors in this.
Debates in International Relations Theory
In mainstream international relations theory (IR theory), three major
approaches can be distinguished:

Realism/Neorealism, Institutionalism, and

Liberalism. Radical approaches, which are not discussed here, include imperialism
theory, world systems theory, and Dependencia. Scherrer (1994) presents a discussion
of more recent radical international relations theory (post-structural, feminist, neo
Gramscian). In political terms realism is mainly connected with Realpolitik-concep
tions, and liberalism with Idealism (Joas, 1994).

Institutionalism shares realist

assumptions but also the idealist belief in cooperation.
Liberal IR theory is based on Kantian and Wilsonian thought and stresses the
influence of domestic, societal factors on states' behavior in international politics
(Doyle, 1986; Kant, 1957; Russett, 1990; Wilson, 1965). It challenges dominant
realist/neorealist (Carr, 1939; Mearsheimer, 1990; Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz 1979) as
well as more recent institutionalist (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Keohane, 1984; Stein,
1982) theoretical approaches, both of which treat differences in domestic society and
state structure as rather negligible for the explanation of state action in the internation-
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al sphere. Institutionalism is often termed "neoliberal". This is problematic because
it focuses on institutionalists' conclusions about the possibility of peace and
cooperation, which are similar to liberal ones, instead of stressing their theoretical
assumptions, which are mainly realist (Moravcsik, 1992).

Recent liberal theory

centers around the question: To what extent do domestic conditions determine a
state's belligerence (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992; Doyle, 1983; Doyle, 1986;
Moravcsik, 1992; Russett 1990)? Whereas neorealists see international conflict as
inevitable because of the anarchical international system, and institutionalists think
that regimes and international institutions can overcome the non-cooperative
consequences of anarchy, liberals argue that the sources of international conflict lie
mainly in the domestic societies. One of their core arguments is that states only
decide to wage war when the mass of people who will bear its costs are excluded
from these decisions.

Thus, if decisionmakers are constrained by an elected

legislature and if they rely on public approval, they will be reluctant to initiate wars
because this could produce political costs for them. The liberal approach to IR theory
thus implies that democracies are more peaceful than authoritarian states, since they
possess such characteristics.
Empirical studies show that societal factors are important for a state's conflict
behavior (James, 1988; James & Oneal, 1991; Ostrom & Job, 1986; Stoll, 1984).
Also, democracies have rarely fought each other, a phenomenon that is unique with
them (Levy, 1988; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Parker, 1994; Rummel, 1983; Russett,
1990). The peaceful behavior among democracies, however, cannot be explained by
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the costs-argument of liberal theory, but rather by the notion of extended democratic
norms of behavior to interstate relations, a recent addition to liberal theory (Maoz &
Russett, 1993).
Nevertheless, the huge body of empirical work on democracy and war clearly
demonstrates that overall democracies are not more peaceful than non-democracies
(Chan, 1984; Maoz & Abdolali, 1989; Small & Singer, 1976; Weede, 1984). They
initiate wars and warlike actions not less frequently than authoritarian states.
Democratic structure apparently has an impact, but this impact is not as simple and
clear cut as liberal theory suggests. Possibly -and hopefully- the liberal argument still
bears some weight but needs to be supplemented by other factors; or, the assumed
constraints are only effective under certain conditions. An examination of domestic
foreign policy decisionmaking processes will help to identify the flaws of the legisla
tive constraints argument.
It should be noted that democratic rule also provides the public and its
representatives with possibilities to put pressure on the executive to use force. Since
the liberal argument is based on the importance of domestic factors for state behavior
it has to take this into account. As we shall see, however, in the period examined
here no such case occurred.
The Case of the United States Congress
To examine the U.S. Congress in the post-World-War-II period serves the
purposes outlined above for several reasons: First, the use of force was at stake in
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a substantial number of cases. Second, the American political system is characterized
by a strong legislative branch. The logic of costs and constraints should apply.
Third, since the Second World War, Congress in most cases has not played an
influential restraining role despite its formal authority and power (see chapter IV).
Factors other than formal weakness might have played a role.
Organization of the Study
Three research tasks are particularly important for this study: (1) identification
of patterns of Congressional behavior, (2) explanation of these patterns, and (3)
discussion of the results in the theoretical context of domestic constraints on
democratic executives.
The method most appropriate to pursue these tasks is structured, focused
comparison of cases, as set forth and described by Alexander George (1979). A case
study design is very helpful when the primary goal is development and refinement
rather than testing of a theory. While case studies fail to provide exact statistical
correlations between certain variables, they give information about which variables
ought to be considered.
Because the method of structured, focused comparison serves as a guideline
for my study, it will be outlined in Chapter II. Subsequently, a discussion of the war
powers provisions of the American Constitution, the War Powers Resolution, and the
various positions on these will help define the class of events to be examined here and
suggest three types of cases (Chapter III). Chapter IV examines existing lines of
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description and explanation of presidential dominance in warmaking, and draws from
these arguments the aspects that this study will focus on.

In Chapter V, the

framework for analysis is developed, consisting of a set of controlled variables and
a set of assumed relationships between these. Also, the cases to be examined here are
selected in the light of these analytical considerations. Following are the actual case
studies (Chapter VI) and a comparative analysis (Chapter VII).
There are mainly two sources of limitations to the relevance of the present
study: First, legislative constraints are only one part of the liberal argument. Future
work has to concentrate on the effect of public opinion, the reliance of democratic
leaders on public approval, and the role of the media. Second, the variance in the
cases examined does not encompass the diversity of cases in the period after the
Second World War. Thus, some arguments could not be discussed sufficiently to
come to final conclusions.

CHAPTER II
THE METHOD OF STRUCTURED, FOCUSED COMPARISON OF CASES
Alexander L. George (1979) attempts to integrate history's focus on the
particularities of a specific case and the generalizations of political science. He argues
that research following a historical, comparative method can identify the variables and
conditions that account for the variety of history. His method can be characterized
as an inductive approach to theory development. The emphasis is on controlled
comparison of a few cases as opposed to statistical comparison of a representative
sample. Instead of examining many cases but few variables, George proposes to
examine many variables but only a few cases. However, he does not propose
ideographic case studies. General variables have to be employed for both description
and explanation, and the class of events or phenomena that is to be examined has to
be defined. The cases selected from this class have to be treated selectively. George
proposes to focus on relevant aspects, i.e., to control a number of variables that are
considered important in the light of the theory.
George suggests the following steps in the development and conduct of a
controlled comparison of cases:
Five tasks have to be performed in phase one, the development of the research
design.
Task one is to specify the research problem, to define properly the class of
7
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events that is to be described and explained, to identify one or more existing theories
that have been or can be used in solving the problem, and to focus on those aspects
of the existing theory that are to be refined.
Task two is the specification of the conditions and variables that will be
controlled.

The framework of the study will

be

completed by identifying the

dependent variable arid the independent variables and by stating which variables will
be held constant and which will be allowed to vary across the cases to be compared.
Task three is the selection of appropriate cases, i.e., cases that fit the
specifications made in task one and two.
Task four is to outline ways in which the variance in the dependent variable
and independent variables can be best described.
Task five is to specify the data requirements for the conduct of the cases
studies. Basically, this means to formulate the general questions to be asked of each
of the cases.
Phase two is the undertaking of the actual case studies. First, the outcome of
the dependent variable is established by applying the historical method, and then
described. Second, historical explanations are developed by using the framework that
was designed earlier. If this framework cannot capture the richness of the historical
case, it has to be redesigned and the case studies have to be redone. George
emphasizes that the objective is to establish plausibility by causal imputation rather
than to find statistical correlations. Alternative explanations are considered. Any one
causal interpretation gains plausibility if it is consistent with the data and the available
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generalizations.
In Phase three the researcher draws theoretical implications from the results
of the cases studies. The explanations for the outcomes, i.e., the variability of the
dependent variable, serve to assess, refine, and/or elaborate (but not test) the initial
theory.
George's outline of his research strategy provides the general guidelines of
how to conduct comparative case studies for theory development. His method can
serve to assess and refine consistent sets of generalizations, maybe even single
hypotheses, as well as full-fledged theories.

CHAPTER III
CONGRESS AND WAR POWERS: TifE CLASS OF EVENTS
The Constitutional Setting
The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power to "raise and
support armies ... ; to provide and maintain a navy" and, most important here, "to
declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal" (U.S. Constitution, article I, section
8). According to Wormuth & Firmage (1989) the latter provision indicates that
Congress was given the power to initiate low-scale conflict as well as full-scale war.
The President is "commander in chief of the army and navy" (U.S Constitution, article
II, section 2). In other words, the President may not declare war, whereas Congress
has no power to command U.S. Armed Forces. At the Philadelphia Convention,
Madison and Gerry made their motion to replace the original phrase "power to make
war" by "power to declare war". This was not in.tended to give the power to make
war to the President, but to clarify that the President has the power to repel sudden
attacks as well as the power to conduct wars once they are Congressionally
authorized, and this was well understood at the time (Farrand, 1991, p. 318; Henkin,
1987). Thus, it is generally agreed upon that if the U.S. is attacked, the President has
the right, even the duty, to command the defensive military actions that he deems
necessary without prior Congressional authorization. But apart from that the power
10

11
to initiate hostilities is contested.
Presidentialist, Congressionalist, and
Shared-Power Interpretations
Following Katzmann (1990) one can distinguish three positions in respect to
American war powers, that is, how the key terms "commander-in-chief' and "power
to declare war" are interpreted. The three positions are: presidentialist, Congressio
nalist, and shared- power.
Presidentialists (Emerson, 1975; Jeffrey, 1988; Moore, 1969; Rostow, 1972;
Sofaer, 1989; Turner, 1991) tend to define Congress's power "to declare war" as
merely formal, while they follow a broad interpretation of the commander-in-chief
clause: they regard it as a grant of power to the President to deploy and use U.S.
Armed Forces in any way short of full-scale war.
Congressionalists (Adler, 1988; Ely, 1993; Koh, 1988a; Koh, 1988b; Lofgren,
1972; Rourke, 1993; Smyrl, 1988; Wormuth & Firmage, 1989) see the power to initi
ate war and warlike actions as solely vested in the legislative branch.

The

commander-in-chief clause is defined narrowly: it does not give the President any
independent political authority (unless the U.S. is attacked), but merely describes the
President's position once the U.S. is engaged in war after an advance Congressional
authorization.
Shared-power advocates (Fisher, 1991a; Fisher, 1991b; Henkin, 1987; Katzma
nn, 1990; Keynes, 1982; Revely, 1981; Sterling-Conner, 1981) stress what they see
as the intention of the framers of the Constitution to provide for joint action of the
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President and Congress. While they strongly reject the presidentialist assertion of the
Congressional power to declare war as a mere formality, they also think that the
President's position as commander-in-chief implies some power concerning whether
and when to engage in armed conflict. In their perspective the actual distribution of
constitutionally granted influence in a certain case depends on the dynamics of both
situational factors and the behavior of the two branches.
The division into these three positions can be found in the debates of the War
Powers Resolution (1973; Deering, 1991).
elements:

This joint resolution has three core

consultation, reporting, and Congressional action. Section 3 calls for

presidential consultation with Congress "in every possible instance" before the
President introduces armed forces in combat or situations where combat must be
expected. Section 4 establishes the requirement of presidential reporting to Congress
within 48 hours, whenever troops have been engaged in combat (sec. 4(a)(l)), have
been deployed to a foreign nation (sec. 4(a)(2)), or when stationed forces in a foreign
nation have been substantially enlarged (sec. 4(a)(3)). Concerning Congressional
action, section 5(b) is of special importance: whenever the President has to submit
a report under section 4(a)(l), he has sixty days, or, if he deems necessary, ninety
days to terminate the operation. If Congress does not authorize the operation during
that period with a majority of both houses, the President has to end the operation.
The constitutionality of section 5(c), stating that Congress can, at any time, stop
unauthorized military operations by concurrent resolution (not subject to a presidential
veto), has become questionable after the Supreme Court's INS v. Chadha decision
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(1983). The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Congress' practice to delegate
legislative authority to the executive while keeping for itself the right to interfere with
the executive's actions under that authority by concurrent resolution.
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) has neither provided a clarification of the
distribution of the war powers, nor has it changed the pattern of presidential
dominance in decisions about when to engage in armed conflict (see chapter IV). The
flaws of the consultation requirement, the lack of definitions of "consultation", "in
every possible instance", as well as "introduction to hostilities", enable the President
to circumvent consultation or to just notify Congressional leaders of decisions already
made. In terms of reporting, presidential compliance has been somewhat better, but
the submitted reports most often do not cite subsection (a)(l) of section 4 which
would start the sixty-days clock of section 5(b). Instances of required presidential
reporting from 1974 to 1991 and presidential compliance with this requirement are
listed in Appendix A.
Proponents of all three positions described above are dissatisfied with the
WPR, but differ over what they are criticizing. presidentialists see it as an unwise,
even unconstitutional Congressional attempt to interfere with the President's war
powers and they want to see it repealed (Emerson, 1975; Turner, 1983; Turner, 1991).
Congressionalists are especially concerned about the fact that the WPR gives the
President the power to conduct unauthorized wars for sixty to ninety days and they
want to strengthen it (Ely, 1993; Schlesinger, 1973). Shared-power advocates do not
see the WPR as unbalanced, but would like to reform and modify it to make it a
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better basis for joint action of the branches (Fisher, 1991a; Fisher, 1991b; Henkin,
1987, pp. 300-01; Katzmann, 1990). Among the very few positive judgements of the
WPR are Franklin (1987) and Sullivan (1987). While being disappointed with its
effect, the main drafter of the War Powers Resolution, former Senator Jacob Javits,
could not see fundamental flaws in it either (1985).
An evaluation of the three positions is tempting here but would be inappropri
ate at this point. The balance of power between the positions changes over time, thus
their dynamics have to be evaluated for every case. If these considerations are
ignored, the study would become a historical. The distribution of constitutional war
powers and the actual potentialities of the Congress and the President to use these
powers can nevertheless serve to distinguish three types of cases. This is noted
below.
Types of Cases
Since WWII, the U.S. has had large parts of its armed forces stationed abroad.
The international responsibilities assumed through alliances have increased tremen
dously. Consequently, U.S. military operations and deployments have been frequent
and worldwide in scope. Assessing all these operations is practically impossible. In
order to define the class of events for this study - operations where an actual use of
military force in combat took place or was at least likely to take place - some
guidelines have to be set forth. Having developed them, lists of cases provided by
other scholars can be used to identify cases that fit the definition. Appendix B
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provides information on existing lists and gives the list developed for this study.
Under the Constitution of the United States Congress has the sole responsibili
ty to raise, fund the armed forces, and declare war. The President, on the other hand,
is the commander-in-chief of the U.S. Armed forces, therefore, he can deploy troops
in peacetime as well as during war, and he can conduct wars, when they are Congres
sionally authorized. Furthermore, he has the authority to repel sudden attacks without
the approval of Congress. Today, most experts accept the power of the President to
defend U.S. territory, as well as its armed forces, citizens, and their property. The
War Powers Resolution states that, acting on his own authority, the President may
only introduce military forces into combat, or into situations where combat must be
expected, if either a declaration of war, a statuary authorization, or a situation of
national emergency exists. The latter can be created by an attack on the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces (section 2(c)). The rescue of
U.S. citizens was not included. Since these provisions are placed in the "Purpose and
Policy" section, most legal scholars regard them as non-binding (Ely, 1993, p. 117;
Smyrl, 1988, p. 26; but see Rourke, 1993, p. 112).
In sum, the President may only put U.S. Armed Forces into combat if
Congress has authorized him to do so, or to immediately reply to an attack.
In practice, however, the President has more power when engaging in armed
conflict. He clearly can enlarge his influence in decisions concerning the engagement
in war by abusing his authority as commander-in-chief. The most striking way to do
so is the deployment of troops for political or military purposes that risks their
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imminent involvement in combat. Combat may then occur as a consequence of such
action, but it does not have to. In such cases, the legal situation is more difficult than
in those where the President deploys tr90ps in order to immediately engage them in
acts of war. The distinction between the rightful exertion of the President's respon
sibilities as commander-in-chief and the provocation of or incremental introduction
to war, can be difficult.
Three types of cases examined here shall be distinguished. Type I cases are
those where the executive branch planned but did not carry out a deployment of U.S.
Armed Forces that would have constituted a type II or type III case. Type II cases
are those where U.S. Armed Forces were deployed in a way that risked their
immediate involvement in acts of war. They are called type Ila when combat actions
followed, and type lib when they did not. Type III cases involve deliberate engage
ments of U.S. Armed Forces in acts of war against territory, armed forces, posses
sions, or citizens of another state.
The examination of type I cases could provide insights into the questions of
whether members of Congress in any way were involved and whether manifestations
or expectations of Congressional objection played a role in the administration's
decision not to use armed forces. One qualification has to be made: type I cases by
definition only include those cases where planning occurred at a high administrative
level, i.e., including a final negative decision by the President. Determining type I
cases is especially difficult since almost all action in such cases takes place at the
planning level within the administration, and hence is difficult to observe. Therefore,
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the compilation of type-I cases in this study is hardly complete. The list of cases of
all three types is given in Appendix B.
The crucial point concerning the type-II cases is not actual combat but the
presidential decision to put troops in harm's way.
It should be noted that the definition of type-III cases implies that four types
of military operations are excluded from this study:

(1)

routine activities (e.g.

maneuvers), (2) use of armed forces in pure non-conflict situations (e.g. disaster
relief), (3) use of armed forces within the U.S., (4) covert actions. While the
exclusion of (1) through (3) is self-explanatory, the exclusion of covert actions
requires explanation. The use of force by non-regular troops and in the engagement
in covert acts of war are indeed a very important way for the Executive branch to
circumvent Congress. The inclusion of such cases, however, would considerably
enlarge the scope of this project.

CHAPTER IV
CONGRESS AND WAR POWERS: DESCRIPTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
The Rise of Presidential Warmaking
Historians and legal scholars have emphasized Congressional responsibility in
the commission of U.S. forces to war and warlike actions.

Nevertheless, the

President's power to order American troops into combat has steadily grown (Cox,
1984; Eagleton, 1974; Javits, 1973; Schlesinger, 1973). Congress, however, has not
always permitted the President to operate without constraints, and there are periods
where a strong and dominant President was followed by Congressional assertiveness.
As Arthur Schlesinger noted, "nearly every President who extended the reach of the
White House provoked a reaction toward a more restrictive theory of the Presidency,
even if the reaction never quite cut presidential power back to its earlier level"
(Schlesinger, 1973, p. 68). Although this process can be observed in American
history, in particular regarding the use of the war powers, it has been less visible since
World War II (Cox, 1984; Dodd, 1979; Schlesinger, 1973, pp. 68-99). In the words
of Louis Fisher, "the pendulum stopped swinging" (Fisher, 1991a, p. 199). President
Franklin D. Roosevelt acquired an exceptionally strong and powerful domestic
position during the 1930s, and World War II enabled him to extend the power of the
presidency in foreign and military affairs. The Cold War did the same for the Truman
18
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administration (Eagleton, 1974; Fisher, 1991a; Kegley & Wittk:opf, 1987; Rourke,
1983; Shull, 1991; Wildavsky, 1966). Observers of the American political scene have
come to the conclusion that the U.S. has more and more been involved in presidential
wars, i.e., wars and warlike actions where U.S. engagement was initiated by the
President without any Congressional authorization. Arthur Schlesinger (1973) called
the period up to the end of the Vietnam War the "Imperial Presidency". Cecil Crabb
and Pat Holt (1992) have distinguished four post-World War II stages of Congress'
foreign policy role: (1) bipartisanship immediately after World War II; (2) the era of
the imperial presidency during the Johnson and Nixon administrations in the course
of the Vietnam War; (3) the period of a more assertive Congress in the 1970s; and
(4) the resurgence of presidential power, beginning with the Reagan years.
In sum, except for some conservatives who have complained about Congressio
nal dominance and the growing interference of Congress with presidential war powers
since the end of the Vietnam war (Jeffrey, 1988; Sofaer, 1989; Weinberger, 1989),
most analysts agree that the post-WWII period has been an era of presidential
dominance and Congressional deference.
This widely held observation of presidential dominance will be confirmed in
the cases chosen for the empirical part of this study.

In light of the power

constitutionally granted to Congress to declare war (see Chapter Ill), the fact that its
actual role in the decisionmaking processes regarding the use of force is very small
demands explanation. Several interpretations of this paradox have been given by
students of the subject. They will be discussed below.
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Explanations of Presidential Dominance
Structural Advantages of the President
The President is in a better position to play an active role in foreign affairs
than Congress for a number of reasons. The shift in emphasis from diplomacy to the
military, and the establishment of an elaborated national security apparatus that
followed the National Security Act of 1947 provided the President with extraordinary
powers. In 1950, the National Security Council's policy paper NSC-68, which was
based on a report by the State and Defense departments, successfully advocated a
large-scale military buildup, and thus gave the President the means necessary to use
his power (Ambrose, 1993, pp. 110-112). The executive branch, although consisting
of large and sometimes diverse bureaucratic bodies, is still less fragmented than
Congress. The President has superior access to information. Furthermore, he is
automatically seen as the key political leader of the country which gives him vast
possibilities to influence both Congress and public opinion. Finally, his position is
even stronger with regard to engagements in military operations, since he is
commander-in-chief of the United States Armed Forces. In sum, active national
security-policy-making is a presidential and not a Congressional domain. Congress,
however, has the capabilities to exert influence on the President's decisions. For one,
it can play an important reactive role, restraining the President in decisions about
whether to get involved in armed conflict. Yet the pattern of presidential dominance
in these decisions after World War II suggests that this seldom happened.
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As demonstrated above, a lack of constitutionally granted powers cannot
account for Congress' acquiescence. While for single members of Congress the
defense of the legislature's war powers against a powerful President is extremely
difficult, especially since the Judicial Branch has declined to interfere on grounds of
the ripeness and political questions doctrines (see below), Congress as an institution
has the power to play an important role in decisions about when to engage in war.
Consequently, scholars who have tried to explain presidential dominance have
concentrated on the lack of Congressional will to restrain the President. While
Congress may be capable of restraining the executive, and has tried to do so several
times (Bricker-Amendment, War Powers Resolution), many members of Congress
have strong inclinations not to do so, especially in times of crisis.
Most researchers agree on the lack-of-will argument but differ about how to
explain Congress' reluctance. Basically two types of motives are described in the
literature: (1) policy-motives and (2) political-motives. Before these are discussed,
a short note on two additional factors might be appropriate.
Partisanship is not often mentioned by students of the Cold War, indicating the
strength of the overshadowing bipartisan consensus. This variable will nonetheless
be controlled in this study for two reasons. First, although partisanship is less influen
tial in presidential political systems than in parliamentary systems, it is the most
reliable predictor of voting behavior even in the United States (Kingdon, 1989).
Second, although the Cold War period was characterized by strong degrees of
bipartisanship, this was neither true for the pre-Cold War era nor will it necessarily
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be a characteristic of the post-Cold War situation. On the contrary, the partisan factor
might now become very important.
A second factor can possibly play an important role. If a military operation
ordered by the President is executed before Congress can act, the center of attention
should shift to the after-the-fact action of Congress. Does Congress react negatively
if its constitutional powers have been ignored or minimized? Assuming that the
success and costs of the operation will play an important role in determining
Congressional after-the-fact action, this question is very much related to the political
motives argument as shown below.
Policy-Motives
From the perspective of policy-motives, members of Congress do not restrain
the President when they support his goals and means. The premise of this argument
is that most members of Congress are more interested in actual policy outcomes than
in constitutional questions. Consequently, even if they have some reservations with
regard to presidential warmaking, they will back the President's policy in the
expectation it will prove successful. Accordingly, if there is strong general policy
consensus in foreign policy, Congress will support it and go along when the President
decides to use military force in pursuit of that policy. In the Cold-War period such
a policy consensus existed: the American population and its policymakers shared a
position of anti-communism that included the willingness to fight what was seen as
the spread of international communism. A number of researchers state that this
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consensus kept Congress from playing a more independent role during that time
(Kegley & Wittkopf, 1987; Rourke, 1993). Others do not analyze Congress in
particular but stress the overall importance of the anti-communism factor for U.S.
military interventions (Tilemma, 1973). While anti-communism is seen as the central
factor that made Congress reluctant to cut down presidential warmaking, other factors
can play that role, too. The widespread concern with state-sponsored international
terrorism in the 1980s is a good example. Exploiting such concerns, Presidents can
dominate decisions about when to engage in armed conflict.
Political-Motives
The second thread of arguments in the literature points to political-related
motives of Congress persons. From this perspective, members of Congress refuse to
object to presidential use of military force, because doing so would create political
costs for them, or, at least, would not be politically beneficial. Especially when a
military operation is already under way, Congress persons consider it politically
unwise to oppose the President even if they are not initially supportive.
Three factors are mentioned in the literature as being responsible for this: (1)
members of Congress act in accordance of an expected or actual rally-around-the-flag
effect (Brands, 1987, p. 622; Rourke, 1983, pp. 208-10; Stoll, 1987), (2) they are
reluctant to assume responsibility for the operation, (3) the President exerts a "symbol
ic supremacy ... over Congress" (Denton & Hahn, 1986, p. 127).

The

rally

effect means that often the use of military force gives the President a short-term boost
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in his public approval (Brody & Shapiro, 1973; Lee, 1977; Mueller, 1973). Speaking
out against the President on that matter and at that time would be highly unpopular
with the voters. It should be noted here that the rally-effect usually only holds for
some weeks. Still, this should be enough time for the President to make the crucial
decisions without Congressional objections. More important, however, is that the
rally-effect is positively correlated with the expectation of military success and/or low
costs (in terms of financial costs and human casualties). Therefore, this first argument
for the political-based explanation also recognizes that if a military operation fails or
becomes significantly more expensive than projected, the President's position weakens
and Congressional criticism can arise.
The second factor is closely related to the first:

taking steps to stop a

presidential deployment of armed forces in combat circumstances requires the
acceptance of great responsibilities in the realm of national security.

Many

researchers argue that most Congresspersons are reluctant to assume these responsibil
ities and prefer the easier way of giving the President discretionary powers (Eagleton,
1974, p. 204; Ely, 1993; Javits, 1985, p. 137; Koh, 1988b, p. 132; Rourke, 1993, p.
143). Especially when U.S. troops are already engaged in combat, opposing the
commander-in-chief could be seen as unpatriotic. While the rally-effect usually fades
away soon, especially if the military operation is less successful than expected, the
more general responsibility-factor may have a longer term impact.
The third factor magnifies the first two. The President gets much more
attention by the media than Congress, especially in foreign and security policy. He
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can thus heavily influence the perception of a foreign policy crisis that will be carried
through by the mass media. In a recent study, the President is even called the "Inter
preter in Chief' (Bostdorff, 1994, p. 4). His symbolic supremacy enables him to
portray his actions in a crisis as bold and decisive steps that serve the United States'
national interests. This enhances the rally effect and increases the responsibilities that
would have to be assumed by members of Congress if they choose to oppose the
President.
Implications
The policy-based and political-based, as well as the partisan-based explanations
all contradict the idea of democratic constraints. The policy argument implies that the
cost-constraints logic does not apply: if there can be a broad policy consensus among
legislators and the public favoring engagements in certain wars or warlike actions, the
liberal assumption that people are principally opposing them is problematic. If valid,
the policy-based argument would suggest that the idea of political constraints caused
by the anticipation of the social costs of wars is either fundamentally wrong, or can
be overshadowed by the consensus provided by policy-related factors such as
anticommunism.
The political-motive argument uses a rationale of political costs that turns the
liberal argument upside down. It implies that for legislators political costs are not
produced by supporting engagements in war, but by opposing them. If this argument
bears much weight, it would suggest that a cost-based explanation is promising, but
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that the liberal reasoning about costs is at best incomplete, since other cost-related
factors play a more central role.
The liberal argument implies that legislatures will exert their constitutionally
granted powers in decisions to use force by institutional action. The partisan-motive
contradicts this notion since it suggests that majorities are more important to predict
the legislature's actions then institutional interests.
The explanations elaborated here are not competitive but compatible, at least
to some extent. Both policy-motives and political-motives can operate at the same
time. Also, while the argument of democratic constraints caused by the social costs
of war might come into operation when obvious and significant costs are created by
a full-scale war, the other factors mentioned can be more important for small-scale
and/or short-term armed conflict.

CHAPTER V
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Dependent and Independent Variables
The Dependent Variable: Congressional Behavior
The dependent variable here is Congressional behavior in cases where a U.S.
military operation, as defined below, was planned and/or conducted. The House of
Representatives and Senate have to be looked at separately.
Four types of possible Congressional action will be distinguished:

(1)

initiation: trying to make the President use the armed forces; (2) support: actively
supporting the President in his use of the armed forces; (3) restraint: trying to limit
or stop the President's use of the armed forces; and (4) review: supportive or critical
action after completion of the military operation.
For each type of Congressional action three different stages shall be
distinguished:

(1) passive:

no action of either House or Senate; (2) partial:

committees and/or Congressional leaders are active; and (3) full: either one or both
houses vote on a resolution or statute.
The potential influence of a passive Congress is very difficult to assess: while
Congress does not act, the possibility for it to act might still influence the President's
decision.
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Congressional leaders in terms of this study are the President pro tempore of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House, Majority and Minority Leaders of both houses,
and the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Foreign Relations/Affairs and Armed
Services Committees. These members of Congress have the position and/or the
expertise in foreign policy to be able to influence the President, their colleagues and
the public. Legislation concerning war powers is usually referred to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and
committee-level Congressional action with regard to foreign crises often takes place
in these committees, making them most important and prominent here. The Armed
Services Committees are of special importance when U.S. armed forces are involved.
Since covert actions have been excluded from this study, Chairmen and Ranking
Members of the Intelligence Committees are not defined as Congressional leaders
here. The extraordinary influence of individual Congresspersons and Senators in
certain periods or situations will, however, be recognized in the case studies.
The Independent Variables
Four independent variables will be controlled: (1) the military operation, (2)
party control of the House and Senate, (3) the President's behavior toward Congress,
and (4) public opinion.
As elaborated in Chapter III, several kinds of military operations are excluded
from this study. Consequently, the term military operation is used in what follows
exclusively for military actions which constitute type I, type II or type Ill cases, as
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defined above. The decisionmaking of a military operation can roughly be divided
in three subsequent phases: (1) initiation: the consideration of a military operation,
the determination of its goals, and the decision to start it; (2) conduct: the execution
of the initiated military operation, and its continuation and/or modification; (3)
termination: the political decision to end the operation and the execution of that
decision.
The duration of a military operation and its intensity, i.e., the quantity of
troops and material involved, must be considered separately. The former is of special
importance since the political- motive argument predicts that Congressional behavior
is influenced by it.
The success of a military operation, defined as its outcome compared to the
expectations stated by the executive prior to it, is crucial for the assessment of the
political-motive argument. If a military operation fails or is in danger of failure, the
political incentives to support the President become smaller for Congresspersons and
may even be replaced by incentives to criticize the administration. Unfulfilled
military goals, a high number of casualties, and an unexpected long duration all
reduce the success of an operation considerably.
The variable of party control in the House and Senate is important to
determine the effect of partisanship as elaborated in chapter IV. For the Senate, the
cloture-margin may also be important.
With regard to the President's behavior toward Congress, cooperative and
non-cooperative Presidents will be distinguished, dependent on how much they
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thought Congress should be participating in decisions about the use of military force.
This variable serves to find out if Congress becomes more supportive, as suggested
by Ely (1993), or merely more active, hence possibly more restraining, when the
President is cooperative and vice versa.
Public opinion favoring or disapproving of a military operation will be
measured with polls (if existent) and analysis of mass media coverage for the different
phases of the operation. This variable serves to determine a potential rally-effect.
Other Considerations
As elaborated above (Chapter IV), the President is better able to play an active
role in decisions about military operations, whereas Congress can exert its influence
reactively. Therefore, Congressional actions initiating military operations are rather
unlikely. The question of whether Congress supports or restrains military operations
initiated by the President can thus be seen as a test of the policy-based and
political-based explanations set forth in Chapter IV.
The policy-motive argument suggests that, given a policy-consensus of the
executive and a large majority of legislators, Congress will constantly support the
President. The political-motive perspective, on the other hand, suggests that, because
of the rally-effect, Congress is more supportive during the initiation and early conduct
phases than during other phases.
The political-motive argument predicts that the success or failure of a military
operation is of great importance for Congressional behavior. The logic of political
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costs and benefits is more strongly related to military success than policy consider
ations are.
At the same time, however, the political-motive argument also states that
legislators want to avoid the responsibility for military operations and their
consequences. Therefore, while Congresspersons will cease to support the President
once a military operation is in danger of failing, they are still reluctant to effectively
restrain him. Rather, Congressional disapproval will be shown through symbolic
actions. Symbolic actions do not disprove the political explanation, they are in
accordance with it. Conversely, the policy-motives argument implies that when a
policy consensus is missing or breaking up, Congress will significantly, and not only
symbolically, restrain the President.
The Selection of Cases
For an optimal selection of cases, all of the following seven criteria should be
taken into consideration: (1) at least one case of each type (I, Ila, Ilb, III); (2) at least
one pre-Vietnam/War Powers Resolution case, at least one post-Vietnam/WPR, and
at least one post-Cold War; (3) at least one successful, and at least one unsuccessful
military operation; (4) at least one of each of the possible combinations of short, long,

.

intense, and low-scale military operations; (5) at least one case involving a
cooperative President and one involving a non-cooperative President; (6) at least one
military operation with clear anti-communist or anti-terrorist objectives, and at least
one clearly non-anti-communist or non-anti-terrorist operation; and (7) at least one
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military operation in each decade.
For practical reasons the selection of cases in this study had to be based on
only a part of this set of criteria, namely on (1), (2), (5), and (6). The greatest
shortcoming of the selection presented in Table 1 is the fact that neither an unsuccess
ful nor a long operation were included. This will be done in later elaborations of this
research project.
Table 1
Selected Cases
Case

Indochina,
1954

Type

I/IIb

Pres.

Era

Military
Operation

Coop.

Pre-WPR

minor,
no casulaities

Libiya,
1986

III

non-coop.

Post-WPR

Persian
Gulf,
1990-91

Ilb/III

non-coop.

Post-CW

successful,
short/low scale,
few casualities
successful,
short/
intense,
few casualties

CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDIES
Structure
Every case study will be presented following the exact same structure: (a) the
conflict situation, (b) the decisionmaking process in the executive, (c) the military
operation, (d) the intervening variables, (e) Congressional action, and (f) analytical
summary.
Part (a) of every case study is essentially a general introduction, however, the
focus is on the role of the United States. Part (b) describes how the executive reached
its decision. One additional objective of this part is to determine if the President has
to be classified as cooperative or as non-cooperative. Part (c) gives information about
the military operation, its length, intensity, and costs.

Part (d) covers the two

remaining intervening variables, partisan control of Congress and public opinion. Part
(e) gives a detailed description of Congressional action related to the crisis. It serves
to classify Congressional behavior. Finally, part (f) puts the empirical findings in the
perspective of the analytical framework.
Chapter VII provides a comparative analysis of the cases in light of the
theoretical considerations elaborated above.
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Indochina, 1954
The Conflict Situation
After World War II the French reaffirmed their control of Indochina (Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia) but soon met increasing resistance by the nationalist Viet Minh who
challenged French colonial rule. France was in a disastrous economic condition and
had to rely on outside help, mainly from the United States.

Yet while the

containment policy of the Truman administration provided the framework for
American support, the United States cautiously avoided any direct intervention.
Individual isolationists, mostly Republicans, even tried to attach non-intervention
provisions to the Mutual Assistance Act of 1953 (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 11).
While the U.S. administration was certainly not sympathetic to the allegedly
communist Viet Minh, it did not want to be considered colonialist.

This was

especially true for Congress which promoted Indochinese independence strongly.
When the military situation worsened for the French in late 1953, however, Congress
appropriated an additional $385 million of military aid on grounds of a vague French
agreement to steps towards granting Indochina independence (Burke & Greenstein,
1989).
In early 1954, the new French commander, General Henri Navarre, was
compelled to wage a decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu, a fortress near the Laotian
border in the north. But even before the elite French units could complete fortifying
the garrison, the Viet Minh attacked with great force. Within a few weeks, the French
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were trapped. France subsequently agreed to put the Indochinese question on the
agenda of the already scheduled Geneva conference, a move to which the United
States was vigorously opposed (Billings-Yun, 1988).
In the first months of 1954, the United States stepped up its material support,
eventually paying more than 80% of the French stationment costs. The Eisenhower
administration considered military intervention, especially in February and March
1954, but except for 200 U.S. Air Force technicians no American soldiers set their
feet on Vietnamese ground. Various interpretations have been offered to explain
American non-intervention.

An early explanation was that the Congressional

leadership, meeting secretly with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on April 3,
1954, prevented intervention (Roberts, 1954). Later, it was asserted that Eisenhower
had not wanted intervention, then, that Dulles had not wanted it (Billings-Yun, 1988;
Herring & Immerman, 1984; Marks, 1990). Any viable explanation, however, has to
consider the roles of the intransigent French as well as the reluctant British.
Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7 but the crisis did not end for the United States
until a settlement was reached at Geneva.
The Decisionmaking Process in the Executive
There are two contending lines of thought about the Eisenhower presidency in
general and about his relations which Congress in particular. Earlier studies tend to
treat Eisenhower as a weak President (Adams, 1961; Capitanchik, 1969; Donovan,
1956; Robinson, 1966). They argued that he did not truly want the job but rather
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considered it his duty. Consequently, he left many decisions to his advisers, or even
to Congress. A well known statement is that he was "passing the buck." In the
1980s, when more documents of the Eisenhower period became available, a basic
revisionism took place. Greenstein (1982) argues that Eisenhower only gave the
impression of a fatherly and friendly leader who wanted the best for all but who was
not interested in the details. In reality, he had great concern about the specifics of
policies and personally made decisions that he considered important (Ambrose, 1990;
Anderson, 1991; Arnold, 1991; Brands, 1988; Burk, 1986; Cook, 1981; Divine, 1981;
Lee, 1981; Pach, 1991; Stassen, 1990; Wykes, 1982).
In regard to decisions to use force Eisenhower has to be considered coopera
tive with Congress, especially in comparison with other post World War II Presidents.
He frequently met with the Congressional leadership and briefed the Republican
leaders on a regular basis. Specifically, his view of the constitutional war powers was
different from his predecessor, Harry S. Truman, because he did not regard his power
as commander-in-chief as including the power to commit American troops to combat

..

(Muskie, 1986). Throughout the crisis, Eisenhower and Dulles emphasized several
times that Congress would have to be in on any military intervention in Indochina
(Burke & Greenstein, 1989).
Indochina was considered strategically important in the global struggle against
communism because, according to the so-called domino theory that came into use at
that time, losing this region to communist forces would only be the beginning of the
spread of communism over all of Asia. The National Security Council (NSC) and
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special planning committees separately began to consider the policy options. Eisen
hower insisted on not excluding any option, so that even nuclear bombing was
contemplated at one time. Eventually, three options evolved: (1) unilateral American
airstrikes; (2) unilateral American military action, including ground forces; and (3)
military action from several nations, including the U.S. (Burke & Greenstein, 1989).
The Special Committee headed by Undersecretary of State Bedell Smith,
reviewed French requests for aircraft and 400 technicians at a meeting on January 29.
It recommended to deploy the aircraft and 200 technicians, provided the personnel
would not be exposed to combat. Eisenhower immediately approved the recommen
dation (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 38). 200 U.S. Air Force technicians and aircraft
were deployed the same day but the administration did not announce the action until
February 6. None of the Armed Services or Foreign Relations Committees had been
involved in the decisionmaking process, and several members of Congress protested
with speeches and public statements (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 38; Scribner,
1980, p. 211). On February 8, Eisenhower met with Republican Congressional leaders
to explain the deployment. In reaction to the leaders' initial opposition he promised
that the soldiers would be removed by June 15, and possibly replaced by civilians.
At a news conference on February 10, Eisenhower emphasized his own opposition to
an American involvement in Indochina (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 39).
In the following weeks the administration concentrated its planning efforts on
the option of unilateral airstrikes. At least twice the French government informally
requested American airstrikes to save Dien Bien Phu. In collaboration with American
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military advisers in Saigon, French strategists even developed a plan called "Operation
Vulture" which was supported by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Arthur
Radford. Eisenhower did consider the idea of a unilateral airstrike, in fact, on April
1 he even considered a covert airstrike. His private statement to two editors that the
U.S. might have to use air power and then would "deny it forever", shows that he was
clearly contemplating deceiving Congress and the American public (Anderson, 1991,
p. 30; Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 49).

In the end, Eisenhower's skepticism

regarding the military benefit of airstrikes prevailed. As the situation in Dien Bien
Phu worsened, airstrikes became even less promising.
Following orders by Eisenhower, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Robert
Camey ordered the Pacific-based U.S. 7th Fleet on alert on March 18 and readied it
to defend Dien Bien Phu within twelve hours' notice. Without letting even the French
know its purpose, the fleet was dispatched to the Gulf of Tonkin (Billings-Yun, 1988,
pp. 43-44). Reconnaissance air units studied Chinese air fields and the conditions of
northern Vietnam communist strongholds. The administration did not inform either
Congress or the British, French, and Vietnamese governments (Billings-Yun i 1988,
p. 90).
Subsequently, the administration and particularly Dulles shifted their attention
to the option of multinational military action. The fact that Congress became involved
in the decisionmaking process in late March and early April to such a great extent has
led students of the Dien Bien Phu crisis to believe that Congress actually prevented
military intervention (Roberts, 1954).
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This view probably developed because on March 29, at the regular weekly
briefing of Republican leaders, Eisenhower announced the possible necessity of
military intervention within 48 hours, which was exactly the time necessary to start
an air strike. The President said he would inform Congressional leaders (Anderson,
1991, p. 29; Burke & Greenstein, 1989, pp. 47-48). The reason for this announcement
is not fully clear. It might have been a tactical move to give Congress a sense of
urgency and emergency before the secret meeting between Dulles, Radford and
bipartisan Congressional leaders scheduled for April 3, 1954.
However, a plan for so called "United Action" had been developed earlier, and
was outlined in Dulles' speech to the Overseas Press Club on March 29. "United
Action" was to include Great Britain, France, local nations, and possibly other partners
as well (Burke & Greenstein, 1989). Also, a resolution had been drafted which was
not to be presented to the Congressional leadership at once because Eisenhower had
advised Dulles "to develop first the thinking of Congressional leaders" (Burke &
Greenstein, 1989, p. 50).

The draft resolution was a basically a blank check

authorization:
The President of the United States ... hereby is authorized, in
the
event he determines that such action is required to protect and defend
the safety and security of the United States, to employ the Naval and
Air Forces of the United States to assist the forces which are resisting
aggression in Southeast Asia, to prevent the extension of that
aggression, and to protect and defend the safety and security of the
United States. This Resolution shall not derogate from the authority of
the Congress to declare war and shall terminate on June 30, 1955,
orprior thereto if the Congress by concurrent resolution shall so
determine. (U.S.Department of State, 1983, pp. 1211-1212)
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The fact that the resolution was not presented to Congress demonstrates that
the administration was insecure about the amount of support it could get. At that
point, Eisenhower, Dulles, and Admiral Radford had basically decided against any
unilateral action and agreed on an intervention plan with strict conditions (Adams,
1961, p. 122). Yet the tactical move to not present the draft resolution was probably
meant to keep all options open. This objective was not achieved since the secret
meeting ended with a tacit agreement on certain conditions for intervention: it would
have to be a multinational effort, and Vietnam would have to be granted indepen
dence.
On April 4, Eisenhower met with the inner circle of his advisers at the White
House to discuss the "United Action" strategy.
intervene under certain conditions.

An agreement was reached to

Although Congressional approval was not

specifically mentioned, the agreement in fact met Congressional conditions (Anderson,
1991, p. 32; Burke & Greenstein, 1989, pp. 67-68). Billings-Yun (1988, p. 100) has
a different reading of this incident. She argues that Eisenhower agreed with the
conditions imposed by the Congressional leadership and on April 4 for the first time
added his own set of preconditions, namely that the coalition would have to include
local forces, that an understanding with France should be achieved, and that advance
approval of Congress was necessary.
The administration increased its efforts to build Congressional support by
letting Capitol Hill know about increased Chinese involvement in the conflict (Burke
& Greenstein, 1989, pp. 68-69) and Dulles tried to commit England and France to the
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"United Action" plan. France answered with pressure and indicated its willingness
to accept any agreement in Geneva unless the United States would intervene with
airstrikes (Billings-Yun, 1988, pp. 105-107). Eisenhower said to Dulles that "in the
absence of some kind of arrangement" with Congress such move would be impossible
(Burke & Greenstein, 1989, pp. 68-69) and thus· Dulles cabled to American
ambassador in Paris, Douglas Dillon, accordingly. Dulles, however, again stated that
the U.S. was prepared to do everything short of belligerency (Billings-Yun, 1989, p.
108).
France answered on April 6 that it would settle for a loan of B-29 bombers
maintained by U.S. personnel but flown by French pilots. The administration held an
NSC emergency meeting on April 6 reacting to the French request as well as to a
study of the Planning Board that had recommended unilateral intervention, and to an
intense debate in the U.S. Senate. Eisenhower said that there was no possibility of
U.S. unilateral intervention. "Even if we tried such a course, we would have to take
it to Congress and fight for it like dogs, with very little hope of success" (Burke &
Greenstein, 1989, pp. 70-71). He also added a new precondition for intervention:
"We would have to be invited in by the Vietnamese" (Billings-Yun, 1989, pp. 109111). On April 8, Admiral Carney cabled the Pacific Fleet to call off reconnaissance
program and to leave the Gulf of Tonkin.
On April 16, Vice President Richard Nixon proposed in an off-the-record
remark, that seemed to be, however, a prepared statement, that the U.S. should
dispatch ground forces if French would withdraw from Indochina. He said, "If to
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avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and Indochina, we must take the risk now
by putting our boys in, I think the Executive has to take the politically unpopular
decision and do it" (Ambrose, 1993, p. 137). Voices of protest were immediately
raised in Congress. More significant was that Dulles' efforts to gather support for
"United Action" were undermined by Nixon's comment. Especially the British
government was angered (Billings-Yun, 1988, pp. 130-131).
The April 21 announcement of airlifts of-French troops to Dien Bien Phu and
the deployment of twenty-five Corsair fighter bombers from the aircraft carrier Saipan
to the French forces in Indochina did nothing to rebuild Congressional support. On
the contrary, there was again protest from Capitol Hill.
At a regular meeting of Eisenhower with Republican Congressional leaders on
,. explained the failure of the "United Action" plan on grounds
April 26 the President

of British and French opposition (Adams, 1961, pp. 123-124). Eisenhower assured
the leaders that the U.S. had tried a concerted approach but "neither the French nor
the British had risen to the occasion" (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 82).
Shortly before and in the weeks after the fall of Dien Bien Phu on May 7,
Congressional leaders became more open to the question of intervention.

The

insistence on participation of Great Britain, whose unwillingness to enter the war is
probably the best explanation for the failure of the U.S. to act, was less strict. The
election of a new French government committed to a negotiated solution, and the
eventual settlement at Geneva ended the crisis.
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The Military Operation
Neither the airstrikes, the main option considered in the administration, nor any
other offensive operation was conducted.

None of the three military operations that

were conducted by U.S. personnel during the Dien Bien Phu crisis (the deployment
of technicians, the deployment of the Pacific fleet, and the airlifts of French troops)
involved American armed forces in combat. The operations were short, successful,
and no casualties were suffered. Yet none of the operations was Congressionally
authorized, indeed, there had been no Congressional involvement in the decisionmak
ing processes. While the deployment of technicians and the show of force by the
Pacific Fleet did not risk American involvement in combat, the airlifts to Dien Bien
Phu did.
Intervening Variables
After the deployment of the Air Force technicians in February the media
exposed a wide mixture of views.

A review of press reactions by the State

Department on February 15 did not interpret the media's reaction as a clear restraint
(Burke & Greenstein, 1989, pp. 65-66).
Public opinion polls showed early on that Americans were not prepared to
accept an intervention so soon after Korea (Donovan, 1956, p. 267). A Gallup poll
in the first week of May, 1954, found only 22% support of an intervention, but 68 %
opposition, and 10% with no opinion. However, this was mostly due to the fact that
the question was phrased in terms of unilateral intervention. An unpublished State
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Department poll on multilateral intervention conducted May 19-22, 1954, showed 69%
support, 23 % opposition, and 8% with no opinion. Here only 21% said they would
approve of a unilateral intervention (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, pp. 112-113).
At the time of the crisis the Republicans had slim majorities in Congress
(eleven votes in the House and only one vote in the Senate). According to Scribner
(1980, p. 207) the Republicans were unfamiliar with the majority positions and thus
not necessarily backing the President. In addition, many Republicans were isolation
ists who did not support Eisenhower's foreign and military policy anyway (Anderson,
1991, p. 19; Capitanchik, 1969, p. 37). Thus the President had to rely on liberal
internationalist Democrats which resulted in the substantial participation of Democrats
in meetings with the administration and probably can explain in part Eisenhower's
fairly cooperative behavior towards Congress.
Congressional Action
Before and throughout the crisis Congress appropriated aid to the French forces
in Indochina on an increasing scale. The hearings conducted at these occasions
focused on the French progress of granting independence to the so called Associated
States.
After the deployment of the Air Force technicians an argument developed
between Congress and Eisenhower. The President claimed that he had informed
Congressional leaders. Senator John C. Stennis (D-MS), a member of the Armed
Services Committee, wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Wilson and also held a
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speech in which he emphasized the danger of a quagmire. "A decision must soon be
made as to how far we shall go .... As always, when we send one group, we shall
have to send another to protect the first and we shall thus be fully involved in a short
time" (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 38).
Although Stennis' concerns were shared by his Democratic colleagues in the
Armed Services Committee he did not express a consensual view. Republican leaders
expressed approval and so did Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) (Burke & Greenstein,
1989, p. 39). The Senate Majority Whip and Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, Leverett Saltonstall (R-MA), led the initial opposition to the deployment.
Eisenhower promised to have them withdrawn by mid-June, and thus won the leaders'
promise to support him on the Hill. Within days, the protests in Congress and the
press faded away (Billings-Yun, 1988, p. 26; U.S. Department of State, 1983, pp.
1023-1025). On the Senate floor Saltonstall and Senate Majority Leader William F.
Knowland (R-CA) then expressed agreement with the administration's action (Burke
& Greenstein, 1989, p. 40).
According to Burke & Greenstein (1989, p. 47), Dulles talked to Republican
and Democratic leaders about his United Action speech at the end of March. A
telephone conversation between Dulles and Knowland took place on March 30, after
the "United Action" speech. Knowland congratulated Dulles on his tough stand
(Billings-Yun, 1988, p. 64). The fact that the Senate debated "United Action" on the
floor that same day indicates that the Congressional leaders present at the secret
meeting on April 3 knew about its existence and content. But Senator Stennis asked,
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"Exactly what is meant by 'United Action' and what is the necessity or the case for
it?" No one answered.
The secret emergency meeting between eight Congressional leaders and Dulles
at the State Department on April 3 did not clarify Stennis' question but it gave
Congress the possibility to make itself heard.
Present were Senators Knowland, Eugene D. Millikin (R-CO), the Senate
Minority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX), Richard B. Russell (D-GA), Earle C.
Clements (D-KY), and the Speaker of the House, Joseph W. Martin (R-MA), as well
as the Minority Whip, John W. McCormack (D-MA) and Representative J. Percy
Priest (D-TN).
The leaders were unanimous in their rejection of a unilateral approach, "We
want no more Koreas with the United States furnishing 90% of the manpower."
Dulles replied that no use of land forces was contemplated. The leaders answered that
once the flag was committed, land forces would inevitably follow and insisted on a
multilateral effort (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 51).
The fact that the Congressmen felt that they would have been asked for a
blank check if they had not made their opposition clear influenced the information
that Congressman McCormack leaked to the journalist Chalmer Roberts (Anderson,
1991, p. 31). The early standard interpretation of U.S. non-intervention stemmed from
the article that Roberts (1954) wrote: "The day we didn't go to war."
In a floor debate on April 6, the Senate reinforced the conditions imposed by
the Congressional leadership three days earlier. Speeches complained about lack of
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information (Cassata, 1986, p. 154) but indicated concern for Indochina and possible
bipartisan support for "United Action" (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 74).
Senator John F. Kennedy (D-MA), the initiator and main speaker of the debate,
said that in order to enlist the loyalties of the Indochinese, independence had to be
granted; otherwise United Action would certainly end up as a unilateral American
action. In summing up past administration's misstatements Kennedy said:
Every year we are given three sets of assurances: first that the
independence of the Associated States is complete; second, that the
independence of the Associated States will soon be completed under
steps 'now' being undertaken; and third, that military victory for the
French Union forces in Indochina is assured, or is just around the
comer, or lies two years off. (Billings-Yun, 1988, p. 118)
Kennedy was then seconded by Knowland, who had initially voiced support
for unilateral intervention, but now spoke against it except in the event of a Chinese
intervention, Warren Magnuson (D-WA), Stuart Symington (D-MO), Clinton
Anderson (D-NM), and Everett Dirksen (R-IL). Even Stennis acknowledged that
under certain conditions Congress would vote to support "United Action". Henry
Jackson (D-WA) emphasized that the country has to be told that the U.S. cannot let
Indochina "fall into Communist hands" (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 74).
Senator Mansfield, who had led a study mission on Indochina in 1953 that had
concluded that American aid should not involve the commitment of combat forces,
demanded to know what was meant by "United Action": "When we refer to 'united
action' we do not know what the Secretary of State is speaking about, except as we
read by the press reports this morning to the effect that the Government has asked for
conferences with Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Is this to be the extent
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of 'united action'?" After a prearranged question to Kennedy, the Senator from
Massachusetts answered that "United Action" was an indication that the U.S. would
take the ultimate step. Mansfield then asked, And what is that? Kennedy answered,
It is war (Billings-Yun, 1988, p. 66).
While "the Senate stressed its reluctance to order American forces into a
colonial war or to take any action except as part of a coalition," many Senators
seemed, however, to be ready to compromise the demand for decolonization (Billings
Yun, 1988, p. 118). Statements both by Stennis and Kennedy indicated that minimal
decrees for real independence would suffice (Billings-Yun, 1988, p. 118).
A speech by Senator Mansfield on April 14

entitled "Last chance for

Indochina" (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 76) indicated further support for the
administration although it again stressed the need for Indochinese independence.
Hubert Humphrey (D-MN), Kennedy, and Knowland voiced agreement with Mansfield
(Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 76).
Nixon's statement on April 16, however, quickly eroded that support. Dulles'
coalition in Congress literally collapsed (Billings-Yun, 1988, pp. 133-134). Even
Knowland immediately joined the opposition and led a Senate demand that
Eisenhower come to Capitol Hill to make full revelation of any secret plans for
invading Indochina. House Majority Leader Charles Halleck (R-IN) told Eisenhower
at the next legislative leaders' meeting that Nixon's remarks had hurt the administrati
on's relations with Congress and urged that there may be no more talk on unilateral
intervention.
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Senator Edwin Johnson (D-CO) stated, "I am against sending American GI's
into the mud and muck of Indochina on a blood-letting spree to perpetuate colonialism
and white man's exploitation in Asia." Senators Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) and
Wayne Morse (lnd.-OR) called for consultation with Congress by the administration.
Senator Saltonstall rose to the administration's defense, indicating that Nixon's
statement did not represent the administration's policy which remained unchanged
(Burke & Greenstein, 1989, pp. 76-77; Gibbons, 1986, pp. 209-210).
After the announcement of airlifts the fragility of the administration's coalition
showed again. Senator Stennis uttered that this was "another step closer to war"
(Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 78).
Yet the erosion of domestic support only added to the diplomatic defeats that
Dulles suffered in his attempts to build "United Action". On April 26, when the
Geneva conference begun, Eisenhower met with the Republican Congressional
leadership to explain the failure of "United Action" (Adams, 1961, pp. 123-124). The
isolationist Senator Millikin suggested to return to the "Fortress America" but
Eisenhower, being a strong advocate of NATO, repudiated this immediately (Billings
Yun, 1988, p. 147).
Later that day Undersecretary of State Bedell Smith discussed the Indochinese
problem with members of the Senate and House Far Eastern subcommittees and was
surprised that the passage of a resolution authorizing the use of air and naval forces,
with or without British participation, was openly considered (Billings-Yun, 1988, pp.
147-148; Burke & Greenstein, 1989, pp. 82-83).
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On May 5, Dulles briefed Congressional leaders who showed agreement with
the administration's actions (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 88; U.S. Department of
State, 1983, pp. 1471-77). The administration had decided against intervention in
Dien Bien Phu because the conditions had not been met and the situation was not
favorable (Billings-Yun, 1988, p. 154).
After the fall of Dien Bien Phu two days later, Dulles told members of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee in executive session on May 11 and members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 12 that the administration would try
to create a situation in Southeast Asia where the domino principle would not occur
(Billings-Yun, 1988, p. 156).

However, Dulles said that if the administration's

conditions, namely that it had to be a coalition effort and that France would have to
grant Indochina independence, were met, Eisenhower would seek Congressional
approval of an intervention.

The Congressmen reacted positively (Burke &

Greenstein, 1989, p. 91). On May 11, the requirement of British participation had
been dropped at a White House meeting (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 90).
The suddenly open attitude of Congress to the question of intervention was
symbolized by Senator Mansfield's non-adverse reaction in a meeting with a
Southeast Asia specialist of the State Department on May 12 when even the
possibility of using American ground forces was
"' mentioned (Burke & Greenstein,
1989, p. 91).
After the Mendes-France government took over in France on June 17 and
committed itself to a quick settlement of the Indochinese crisis, the Eisenhower
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administration requested one billion dollars in military and economic assistance to
Indochina for the next fiscal year. Congress overwhelmingly approved. However,
Senator William Fulbright's (D-AR) remark that he was reluctant to intervene as long
as Indochina was a colony still found widespread agreement.
In the politics of a mid-term election Democratic spokesmen criticized the
government of being ready to countenance a Communist takeover in Asia. But since
they had opposed unilateral intervention earlier, their criticisms were limited. Senator
John Sherman Cooper (R-KY) pointed out, "My friends on the other side of the aisle
cannot have it both ways" (Burke & Greenstein, 1989, p. 94).
Dulles expected a partition of Vietnam. When Congressional leaders were
briefed on the situation in Geneva, where the U.S. was not an active participant, on
June 23, Senator Knowland said, "we now have a Far Eastern Munich" (Burke/Green
stein 1989: 94). Eisenhower rejected this notion by emphasizing that the Indochinese
situation was simply the acceptance of a military fact (Billings-Yun, 1988, p. 157).
Analytical Summary
The decisionmaking process in the Dien Bien Phu crisis is a type I case
because the planned operations were not conducted and thus the initiation phase was
not completed. A minor exception was the airlift of French troops.
The case study confirms the classification of President Eisenhower as
cooperative. Congress had opportunities to act. The Congressional leadership was
involved in the decisionmaking process almost on a regular basis. Although the
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Eisenhower administration engaged in some purely tactical behavior toward Congress
and acted unilaterally in some instances (deployment of technicians, deployment of
Pacific Fleet, airlifts), there is no indication that an attack conducted by regular U.S.
troops would have been ordered without Congressional approval.

Eisenhower,

however, contemplated a covert airstrike operation.
Public opinion polls showed a reluctance to become involved in Asia so soon
after the Korea experience. Eisenhower did not attempt to mobilize public support
and thus it is not known how the American people, and Congress for that matter,
would have reacted to strong anticommunist rhetoric.
Congress was partially active. The leadership frequently met with Eisenhower,
committees conducted hearings, and the matter was debated in the Senate but not
voted on. Contrary to the assumption of Ely (1993), Eisenhower's fairly cooperative
behavior did not provide him with a supportive Congress. Although the impact of the
conditions that the Congressional leadership imposed on a military intervention is not
fully clear, Congress's actions can be classified as partially restraining.
After the fall of Dien Bien Phu, members of Congress became more open to
intervention. At no point, however, did Congress come close to initiating an offensive
military action. There was no significant post-hoc evaluation of the crisis.
Libya, 1986
The Conflict Situation
Tensions between the U.S. and Libya had existed for at least six years before
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they culminated in U.S. airstrikes April 14, 1986. As early as February 1980, the
U.S. had closed its embassy in Tripoli after Libyan citizens had set fire to it. In May
1981 the U.S. ordered Libya to close its diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C.,
claiming Libya supported international terrorism ("U.S./Libya Chronology," 1986).
In August 1981, U.S. Navy jets shot down two Libyan fighters over the Gulf
of Sidra. The American pilots stressed that the Libyans had fired first. Libya had
been claiming a 120-mile zone off shore the Gulf of Sidra, whereas the U.S. (as well
as the Soviet Union) only accepted the 12-mile zone in accordance with international
law. In subsequent years the U.S. conducted a number of so-called Gulf-of-Sidra
exercises by moving ships and planes into the territorial sea claimed by Libya.
Washington also imposed economic sanctions on Libya and repeatedly accused the
regime of Colonel Qaddafi of supporting terrorist actions. After terrorists conducted
attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, the U.S. claimed Libya
had aided them ("Six Hostile Years," 1986).
On March 24, 1986, U.S. Navy planes were fired upon by Libyan forces. In
response, they attacked two Libyan patrol boats in the Gulf of Sidra. U.S. forces also
attacked Libyan radar and land-based batteries. President Reagan reported these
incidents to the Speaker of the House and the Senate President pro tempore. The
report, however, was only submitted "in accordance with my desire that Congress be
informed on this matter," and did not mention the War Powers Resolution (U.S.
Congress 99-2. House, 1986a).
On April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded in a West Berlin discotheque, injuring 230
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people and killing a Turkish woman and an American soldier. U.S. officials said they
had clear evidence from intelligence sources that Libya was responsible for the attack
(Boyd, 1986).
During the following days the tension increased with President Reagan calling
Qaddafi the "mad dog of the Middle East" and Qaddafi threatening that if the U.S.
attacked Libya, suicide commandos would strike against U.S. nuclear bases in Europe
("Six Hostile Years," 1986; "U.S./Libya Chronology," 1986).
The Decisionmaking Process in the Executive
On April 7, the Ambassador to West Germany, Richard Burt, pointed out that
there was clear evidence for a Libyan involvement in the terrorist bombing of the
West Berlin discotheque of April 5 (Boyd, 1986). White House officials said Burt
was right, but criticized him for speaking publicly about the matter at that point
(Goshko, 1986).
A plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for surgical strikes against targets in
Libya was approved by President Reagan shortly after Burt's statement (Boyd, 1986).
The existence of a plan for "retaliatory strikes" was made public as early as on April
7 (Kempe, 1986). On the subsequent days there was open discussion in the mass
media about the high likelihood of a military operation against Libya. On April 10
and 11, journalists of NBC reported, the question was not if the U.S. would strike but
when (Boyd, 1986).
According to officials, the air strike had been in planning for months; after the
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discotheque bombing the Pentagon only updated these plans. Officials also disclosed
that the JCS had started drawing up target lists right after the terrorist attacks on the
Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985. Libya was accused by the United
States of harboring the terrorist group, Abu Nidal, that had conducted these attacks
(Wilson & Hoffman, 1986).
Once the basic decision was made, Pentagon planners wanted to conduct the
raid as quickly as possible in order to keep secrecy, whereas the CIA asked for more
time to get its agents in Libya out of harm's way ("Reagan's Raiders," 1986).
From April 11 to April 14, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Vernom Walters,
was sent to visit U.S. European allies to get their support for the air raid. The French,
West German, Italian, and Spanish governments, however, did not approve it. Only
Great Britain backed the United States. The U.S. decision for the air strikes, however,
had already been made (Boyd, 1986).
The specifics of the operation were decided very late. In the meantime,
according to the administration, more evidence was sought on Libyan involvement in
the terrorist attack in Berlin. On Sunday, April 13, Vice President Bush, National
Security Adviser John Pointdexter, and other senior White House advisers discussed
the plan. For a low-level night attack that would cause a minimum of American
losses and civilian casualties in the target area, the land-based F-111 bombers were
needed. The carrier-based A-6 planes could have been used as well, but there were
not enough of them available. Therefore, the military planners decided to use the
F-111 s that were stationed in Great Britain (Boyd, 1986).
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On Monday, April 14, at 4 p.m. (EST), when the planes were already in the
air, but before the bombing started, the White House called in Congressional leaders
and informed them about the plan (see detailed description under Congressional
Action). The Soviet charge d'affaires in Washington also was informed of the action
while it was in progress (Wilson & Hoffman, 1986).
The Military Operation
On April 14, 1986, eighteen U.S. F-111 bombers took off from a British air
base and skirted France and Spain, both of whom had denied the U.S. the use of their
air space. The jets were refueled on U.S. tankers on the way several times.
Striking in two waves, the F-111s bombed a naval base, Colonel Qaddafi's
headquarters, and a military airfield in Tripoli on April 15 at 2 a.m. Libyan time (that
is, April 14, 7 p.m. Eastern time). They were supported by carrier-based fighters that
attacked and disabled Libyan radar sites with missiles. At the same time, U.S. carrier
aircraft hit barracks and an airfield in and near the Libyan port of Benghazi.
According to Pentagon officials, thirty-three Air Force and Navy planes participated
in the ground attacks on Libya. Altogether, some one-hundred U.S. planes had taken
to the air in the course of the strike ("100 U.S. Planes," 1986).
Estimates about the number of Libyan casualties in the air raid ranged from
thirty-seven ("A New Kind," 1986) to over one-hundred ("Libyans Denounce U.S.,"
1986), some of whom were civilians. In one residential area, damage was done to a
few buildings, the French embassy among them. U.S. officials pointed out that the
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"collateral damage" could have been caused by the unsuccessful firing of Libyan's
own missiles. This explanation, however, was rejected by military experts as highly
unlikely, or even impossible for technical reasons (Mohr, 1986).
The U.S. lost one F-111, manned by two Air Force officers. Soviet officials
claimed that three U.S. planes had been downed and another two damaged. White
House Spokesmen repudiated this assertion (Eaton, 1986).
The President officially reported the air strikes to the Speaker of the House on
April 16. Pointing out that "these strikes were conducted in the exercise of our right
of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter", the President provided
the report "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" and "pursuant to my authority
... as Commander in Chief of United States Armed Forces" (U.S. Congress 99-2.
House, 1986b).
Intervening Variables
At the time of the raid, there was a Democratic majority in the House of
Representatives but a Republican majority in the Senate.
Both the available polls and the statements in the mass media indicate that the
public favored military action against Libya highly.

Before the raids no poll

specifically asked about possible airstrikes. The Gallup- Poll (March 26 and 27,
1986), however, asked a question related to the issue at hand. Although 43% thought
the U.S. maneuvers in March had been an attempt to provoke a Libyan attack, 75%
said subsequent attacks on Libyan ships and military sites had been justified
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("Kaddafi' s Crusade," 1986).
Immediately after the attack several polls showed that U.S. public opinion
approved of the air strike:

(a) Yankelovitch/ Clancy, Shulman: 71% approval

("Hitting the Source," 1986, p. 26); (b) Gallup: 71% approval; 62% say Reagan made
wise use of military force. ("Getting Rid of Kaddafi," 1986, p. 22); (c) ABC-News
(April 24): 76% approval; majorities among all population groups (that is, also among
Democrats, women, African-Americans); and the general approval rating of President
Reagan went up to 70% (Sussman, 1986).
According to its own statement, the White House press office received a very
high number of calls from American citizens in the days after the strike, about 80%
of whom were supportive of President Reagan's decision (Howe, 1986).
NBC News got to know of the air raid on Monday, April 14, at 3 p.m. Eastern
time, that is, before Congressional leaders were briefed. It kept it quiet ("NBC
News," 1986). By and large, the media tended to avoid criticism. But the more or
less favorable media coverage cannot explain the strong Congressional support for the
President, because many of the statements of Congresspersons were made before the
press covered the raids.
Congressional Action
On Feb. 19, 1986, the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary held "Hearings on Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism" (U.S.
Congress 99-2. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, 1986).
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Eight members of Congress (from both parties and both Houses), none of
whom a Congressional leader as defined in this study, sent a letter to the President on
April 11. They noted the growing number of statements of the administration about
the imminence of military action against Libya and urged the President to "consult
[with Congress] fully and substantively, not in a proforma manner" (U.S. Congress
99-2. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1986, pp. 281-283). The members of
Congress were Senators Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and Charles McC. Mathias (R-MD),
and Representatives Howard Berman (D-CA), Don Edwards (D-CA), Jim Leach
(R-IA), Matthew McHugh (D-NY), John F. Seiberling (D-OH), and Morris K. Udall
(D-AR).

Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), Chairman of the Foreign Relations

Committee, sent a letter to the Secretary of State, also callingfor consultation (Lugar,
1988).
Thefollowing members of Congress were present at the White House briefing
on April 14, 1986, 4 p.m. (EST): Senators Robert Dole (R-KS), Majority Leader,
Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), Minority Leader, Strom Thurmond (R-SC), President Pro
Tempore, Richard G. Lugar, Clairborne Pell (D-RI), Ranking Minority Member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, Sam Nunn (D-GA), Ranking Minority Member of the
Armed Services Committee; Representatives Robert H. Michel (R-IL), Minority
Leader, Dante B. Fascell (D-FL), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
William S. Broomfield (R-MI), Ranking Minority Member of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, Les Aspin (D-WI), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and
William L. Dickinson (R-AL), Ranking Minority Member of the Armed Services
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Committee.
Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AR), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee
and Representatives Thomas P. O'Neill (D-MA), Speaker, Jim Wright (D-TX),
Majority Leader, Thomas S. Foley (D-WA), Majority Whip were unable to attend but
were personally briefed by officials of the Executive branch.
The meeting started about three hours before the raids were executed over
Libya, when the planes had already been in the air for more than an hour. The
session took two hours. The administration was represented by President Reagan,
Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Defense Secretary Weinberger, CIA
Director Casey, JCS Chairman Crowe, and National Security Adviser John Poindexter.
Reagan left after one hour. Poindexter presented the evidence that linked Libya to the
Berlin discotheque bombing. No serious objections were raised by Congressmen.
Some, like House Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-IL), however, complained later
that the termination of the operation had not been a real choice anymore ("Hitting the
Source," 1986). One participant said, the present members of Congress were informed
in a "matter-of-fact manner" (Boyd, 1986).
Immediately after the Attack several Congresspersons made public statements.
The Republican Senators were mostly in favor of the President's actions but some
critical voices were heard as well. Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) said that the President
had done what the American public had wanted him to do, and that the operation had
been the appropriate response to the terrorist attack in Berlin (Fritz & Tumulty, 1986).
Senator Richard Lugar emphasized that the President had had the right to act as he
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did, and that the action had been within international law, which allows proportionate
self-defense. The operation, however, set no precedent for similar situations. Lugar
emphasized that there should be more and earlier consultation with Congressional
leaders and that it was arguable whether the White House briefing had been sufficient
to comply with the WPR (Fritz & Tumulty, 1986; Donosky & Collis, 1986; Roberts,
1986a). Senator John Warner (R-VA), a member of the Armed Services Committee,
uttered "grave concerns" about pursuing military operations without support from
American allies (Roberts, 1986a). Senator Lowell Weicker (R-CT) even found "no
difference to what Qaddafi had done" as compared to what the U.S. had done, and
said "I don't want the U.S. at that level". He was afraid that the administration's
policy would lead to a series of similar confrontations with Nicaragua and Angola
(Roberts, 1986a). Senator Dan Quale (R-IN) expressed undivided support: "President
Reagan made a brave, balanced and bold decision to retaliate in the defense of
freedom against the onslaught of a hostile totalitarian regime" (Roberts, 1986a).
By and large, Democratic Senators were equally supportive. Senator Robert
Byrd (D-WV) expressed concern that the action will set a precedent. He argued that
there had been no compliance with the WPR because no consultation but merely
notification had taken place. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) supported the President, but
said he should have preferred an economic embargo, which had been rejected by the
U.S. allies. He was critical, however, that there was not enough consultation with
Congress (Fritz & Tumulty, 1986; Roberts, 1986a). Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT),
Ranking Member of the Select Committee on Intelligence said that there was
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irrefutable proof for Libya's involvement in the Berlin discotheque bombing. He
explained the tendency in Congress to stay behind the President by saying "You can't
send out mixed signals to the rest of the world" (Roberts, 1986a). Senator Edward
Kennedy (D-MA) emphasized the same point when he said, "All Americans should
stand with the commander in chief at this moment" (Walsh & Dewar, 1986).
As in the Senate, support in the House of Representatives was bipartisan.
Opposition was also voiced on both sides of the aisle. Minority Leader Michel
supported the President's decision, but was afraid of escalation. He said Congress
should have been involved in the decisionmaking process earlier (Roberts, 1986a;
Walsh & Dewar, 1986). Representative William Dickinson (R-AL), Ranking Member
of the Armed Services Committee, supported the President by stating that the
procedure was in accordance with the WPR (Roberts, 1986b).
The Speaker Thomas O'Neill (D-MA) did not issue a statement on April 15
but indicated his support of the President's action one day later (Roberts, 1986a).
Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL) declared the action unconstitutional.

It

constituted a "broad arrogation of power by the President" and a precedent that will
stay with the country for a long time. Although he supported the raids as an act of
self-defense, he warned of the circumvention of "constitutional requirement that only
the Congress can take the country into war"

(Fritz & Tumulty, 1986; Roberts,

1986b). Fascell suggested that the President should ask for a Congressional resolution
supporting future actions against terrorism (Roberts, 1986b). Representative Robert
Torricelli (D-NJ), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who is known as a
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liberal Democrat, considered the raids an appropriate response and said that no
division will be found on this point in either House (Walsh & Dewar, 1986).
Representative Don Edwards (D-CA), the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, wrote in the op-ed page of the New York Times on April 23
that the bombings were an unconstitutional usurpation of warmaking power by the
• J,
President. He conceded that they had been popular with the public
and thought they

might even be effective in stopping future terrorist attacks (Edwards, 1986).
Congress took action on the committee and floor levels during the following
days and weeks. On April 17, Representatives Joe L. Barton (R-TX), Duncan Hunter
(R-CA), and Bob Livingston (R-LA) introduced H.R.4611 ("Anti-Terrorism Act") in
the House. The bill was referred to the Foreign Affairs and Judiciary Committees.
Senators Dole and Jeremiah Denton (R-AL) introduced the same bill to the Senate as
S.2335.

The Anti-Terrorism Act would have given the President the power to

"undertake actions to protect United States persons against terrorists and terrorist
activity through the use of all such antiterrorism and counterterrorism measures as he
deems necessary" (U.S. Congress 99-2. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1986,
pp. 218-222).

In these cases the Act would have superseded the War Powers

Resolution, nullifying both its consultation and its durational limit provisions and
extending the time within which the President has to report to Congress from 48 hours
to 10 days. Neither bill was approved in committee.
April 17 was also the day when H.RES. 424 was submitted by Representatives
Ike Skelton (D-MO), John Rowland (R-CT), and 230 cosponsors.

This House
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Resolution was "to express the gratitude of the American people for the assistance
provided by the Government and people of the United Kingdom during defensive
operations carried out against Libya on April 14, 1986" (U.S. Congress 99-2. House,
1986c). It was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which approved it.
Chairman Fascell, who had been critical of the air raids, surprisingly urged its
adoption.
On April 29, May 1 and 15, the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International
Security and Science of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held "Hearings on
War Powers, Libya, and State-Sponsored Terrorism." A number of legal experts as
well as Congressmen issued statements as witnesses (U.S. Congress 99-2. House.
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1986, pp. 5-205).
On May 8, Senators Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), Alan Cranston (D-CA), Daniel
K. Inouye (D-HI), Clairborne Pell (D-RI), and Thomas Eagleton (D-MO), introduced
S.J.RES. 340, which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The bill
was to amend section 3 of the War Powers Resolution by establishing a permanent
body for consultation with Congress. This body would have been composed of the
Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate, the Majority and
Minority Leaders of both chambers, and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority
Members of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations/Affairs, and Intelligence
Committees of both Houses (U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs,
1986, pp. 216-217). The bill died in committee.
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Analytical Summary
The airstrike operation against Libya is a type III case. President Reagan
ordered military actions by United States armed forces that, in terms of international
law, constituted acts of war.
During the initiation phase Congress was almost totally excluded from the
decisionmaking process. This confirms the classification of President Reagan as non
cooperative.
The support for retaliatory action expressed in public opinion polls and by the
media provided the basis for a possible rally effect.
Although Congress was ignored by the President, Congress would have had
time to become active because plans for a retaliatory action had become apparent at
least a week before the actual operation. Individual members of Congress indeed
became active, as indicated by the two letters to Reagan. These actions are not
sufficient to classify Congress's behavior as partially restraining in this initiation
phase. Congress as an institution remained passive, and so did the leadership as a
whole.
When the briefing to inform the Congressional leadership about the airstrikes
took place the military operation was already under way. At that point restraint was
not an option anymore.
Since the airstrike operation was very short, Congressional action during the
conduct phase was impossible. Thus, only post-hoc evaluation remained as a viable
option for Congress.

Besides individual statements, there was only one critical
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motion, S.J.R. 340, which was introduced by the Senate Democrats to improve the
consultation provisions of the WPR. Other post-hoc actions, the resolution to express
gratitude to Great Britain and the proposed Anti-terrorism bill, were supportive of the
President. Thus, in the post-hoc phase Congress displayed fully supportive but also
partially restraining action, the restraint being partisan.
Persian Gulf, 1990-1991
The Conflict Situation
Before the beginning of the Gulf crisis 1990-91, tensions between Iraq and
Kuwait had existed for many years. After the partition facilitated by Great Britain
Iraq insisted that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq.
When Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979 he at first kept amicable
relations with the Gulf states because he needed their support in the war against Iran.
Saddam's hegemonic aspirations were, however, frustrated. Iraq's economic situation
deteriorated because of the long war, and it became more dependent on oil export
revenues than ever. In the months preceding the invasion Iraq expressed serious and
at least partly valid complaints about Kuwaiti oil policies. Kuwait kept the price low
because it no longer depended on oil, and was more interested in its stock investments
which would have suffered from higher oil prices. Saddam even accused Kuwait of
having stolen oil during the Iran-Iraq war by using drilling on an angle into Iraqi
territory. In July 1990, Saddam forcefully demanded that Kuwait must obey the
OPEC oil quotas it had agreed to and that it also accept border changes. Because of
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old claims, Iraq was specifically interested in readjusting the border in the Rumalia
sector where oil fields crossed the border, and with regard to the Warba and Bubiyan
Islands. Only two weeks later, after talks with the intransigent Emirs had failed, Iraq
invaded and then occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990 (Brune, 1993, pp. 30-37).
The United States initially reacted modestly to the invasion. President George
Bush then consulted with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and decided to
deploy troops, first and foremost to defend Saudi Arabia but later to develop the
capacity for offensive action. During the months following the invasion, American
diplomacy also master-minded a coalition of thirty-eight countries, and found support
for its actions in the United Nations and even in the Soviet Union.
The United Nations Security Council authorized its member states to use force
if the Iraqi forces did not leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991. One day after this
deadline passed, the allied troops led by the United States began air raids on Iraqi
troops, infrastructure, and weapons plants. The ground offensive began on February
24 and lasted 100 hours. Bush offered and, after Iraq's acceptance, ordered an
immediate cease fire on February 28. Hussein remained in control, and Iraq remained
intact. In the aftermath of the crisis, American troops were ordered into Iraq to
protect Kurds and Shiites who felt encouraged by Bush's statement to the effect that
Iraqis should themselves dispose of Saddam Hussein. Some American troops also
stayed in Kuwait to help in dealing with the devastation of the war.
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The Decisionmaking Process in the Executive
After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and particularly during the Iran-Iraq
War, the U.S. had tilted towards Iraq and given it considerable support, regarding it
as a moderate state that could counterbalance the fundamentalists in Iran. In October
1989 President George Bush issued an executive order to continue the attempts to
build good relations with Iraq. Accordingly, the White House's first reaction to the
invasion was rather moderate. There were no discussions of a U.S. military response.
However, Bush ordered a freeze of all Iraqi assets in the U.S. and a termination of all
trade. Neither the joint statement by Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze nor the first statements and actions by the
U.N. Security Council and NATO indicated any plans for an intervention or other
military initiatives (Brune, 1993, pp. 52-56).
The initial reaction corresponds with the pre-invasion remark the U.S.
ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, made to Saddam on July 25, "We have no opinion
on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait" (Smith, 1991,
p. 56), and with Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly's statement in hearings of
the Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 31,
1990. Asked by Chairman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) if it was correct to say that the U.S.
did not have a treaty commitment which would obligate it to engage U.S. forces there,
Kelly had answered: "That is correct" (Smith, 1991, pp. 59-60).
Before he left for Aspen, Colorado, where he had a speaking engagement,
Bush stated at a press conference on August 2, "We're not discussing intervention.
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I'm not contemplating such action" (Smith, 1991, p. 64). King Hussein of Jordan
spoke to Saddam on the same day and was assured that Iraq would withdraw soon.
King Hussein then informed Bush. Bush agreed not to threaten Saddam for forty
eight hours. After the meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who
also spoke in Aspen, Bush broke that agreement. Thatcher had encouraged him to
take a tough stand (Brune, 1993, p. 55).
At a joint press conference at Aspen, stilt on August 2, 1990, Bush then said
that he did not rule any options out. According to the Washington Post, this reopened
the door to a U.S. military operation. Bush urged the international community to
condemn the "naked aggression" and ensure that Iraqi forces leave Kuwait (Smith,
1991, pp. 66-67).
On the morning of August 3, 1990, Bush made clear his determination to
intervene at a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC accepted
the policy change without a discussion of policy alternatives. Bush had only talked
with National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft beforehand, who had recommended
a vigorous response to this threat to vital U.S. interests (Smith, 1991, pp. 68-69). At
a meeting in the afternoon of the same day the NSC primarily discussed the problem
of not having many U.S. troops in the Middle East. Bush had already instructed
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JSC), Colin Powell, to lobby Saudi Arabia, a long-time ally of the U.S., to accept
American troops.

Simultaneously, the administration started a press campaign

emphasizing the threat to Saudi Arabia, which, however, neither the CIA nor the
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Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) believed probable at the time. The U.S. also
pressed for a resolution of the Arab League condemning the invasion, which was
passed on Saturday, August 4 (Smith, 1991, pp. 75-79).
At a NSC meeting at Camp David on August 4, military options for the
defense of Saudi Arabia were discussed. Secretary of State James Baker was not
enthusiastic about the prospect of troop deployments, but concurred. Powell and
General Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of Central Command, which dealt with
the Middle East but was headquartered in Florida, demanded clear objectives and
stressed that force, if it had to be used, must be used decisively. The administration
did not have a single senior expert on the Middle East, thus there was no discussion
of the wisdom of the policy, only of how to accomplish it. Schwarzkopf made clear
that ground forces would be needed (Smith, 1991, pp. 80-85; Woodward, 1991, p.
251).
When Bush arrived from Camp David on August 5, no progress with King
Fahd of Saudi Arabia or other Arab leaders, except for the Egyptian President Hossi
Mubarak, had been made. Iraq had begun its announced withdrawal but there were
signs that an Iraqi-controlled puppet regime would stay in Kuwait.

Bush told

reporters: "This will not stand-this aggression against Kuwait" (Smith, 1991, p. 89).
Again, Bush made an important policy decision without any consultation or debate.
After Cheney met with King Fahd on August 6, the latter finally agreed to ask
for U.S. help. Cheney had presented him a quasi-ultimatum: the U.S. would defend
but not liberate Saudi Arabia. On August 6, Bush met with Thatcher in the White
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House. The mood was euphoric when Cheney called from Saudi Arabia and when
the news came that the U.N. Security Council had passed a resolution to impose
economic sanctions on Iraq. On the same day Saddam sent a message to Bush
explaining his position on Kuwait, and emphasizing that he had no plans with regard
to Saudi Arabia. It was decided not to answer him (Smith, 1991, pp. 91-94).
Two days later, in the televised announcement of his decision to intervene,
President Bush was at best inaccurate about the facts. He implied an immediate Iraqi
threat to Saudi Arabia and an urgent request from King Fahd. He said the mission
of the troops was "wholly defensive" and called it "Desert Shield" (Brune, 1993, p.
57). At the following press conference he said, "A line has been drawn in the sand"
(Smith, 1991, p. 99). The media did not ask Bush if the deployments served other
purposes, namely to amass leverage to force Saddam out of Kuwait.
Bush enjoyed public and Congressional support for his decision. However, the
actual size of the deployment was revealed in the next days, and this only because
Army General Carl Vuono leaked the real number of 250,000 to the Associated Press.
The White House had initially spoken of 50,000 (Smith, 1991, pp. 104-105).
A letter that Bush wrote to the Speaker of the House Tom Foley (D-WA) and
to Senate President Pro Tempore, Robert Byrd (D-WV) on August 9, served to report
the deployment "consistent with the War Powers Resolution" but did not trigger the
sixty/ninety days provision. He told Congressional leaders that he did not think
hostilities were imminent and no reference was made to possible offensive action
(Collier, 1994, p. 28).
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During the following days, Bush worked to bring the alliance in line. He was
successful in Turkey and also in most member states of the Arab League which,
except for the PLO and Libya, voted to send troops (Smith, 1991, p. 128).
On vacation in Kennebunkport, Bush ordered the Navy to enforce the U.N.
sanctions on August 12. He acted on his own authority and thus again made an
important policy decision alone. On August 18, U.S. ships fired warning shots at
Iraqi tankers (Smith, 1991, pp. 130-131). Five days later Bush for the first time
publicly acknowledged that offensive action was an option. He told reporters, "I don't
rule in or out the use of force" (Smith, 1991, p. 138).

Individual members of

Congress reacted with cautioning appeals.
On August 28, the President briefed key members of Congress to the effect
that he was trying to persuade Saddam to withdraw. Bush assumed that overwhelm
ing force would convince Saddam that he would not stand a chance. The members
indicated support for this policy.
Two days later the Bush administration rejected an offer by the Iraqi Foreign
Minister, Tariq Aziz, to release the hostages against an American pledge not to attack
Iraq. Baker told the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 4 that the
administration rejected the idea of giving Saddam a face-saving exit (Smith, 1991, pp.
144-149).

A week later, after the international coalition was solidified, Bush

addressed a televised joint session of House and Senate and repeated the objectives
he had stated on August 8: unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwaiti
government, stability of the Persian Gulf, and the protection of U.S. citizens. He said,

73

"We will not let this aggression stand," but did not mention specific military actions
(Smith, 1991, p. 158).
On September 21, Bush again met with key members of Congress. This time
he laid out a number of events that could trigger a war. Although the participants
were more critical than at any prior meeting both House and Senate afterwards passed
resolutions supporting the President's actions thus far. They did not endorse use of
force, but indicated support for "continued action by the President ... to deter Iraqi
aggression and to protect American lives and vital interests" (Collier, 1994, p. 28;
Smith, 1991, p. 161).
On October 3, Saddam addressed his troops in Kuwait and emphasized that he
was not willing to compromise or give up Kuwait, which he called Iraq's nine-teenth
province. Bush, who had expressed his hope in a diplomatic solution just before
Saddam's remark, intensified his attempt to build the coalition against Iraq. Because
of the growing tensions, Bush came under increased pressure from Congress for
greater consultation. Cheney, however, dismissed the concerns on October 3, "I have
to say it was an advantage that Congress was out of town" when the initial deploy
ment to the Gulf took place (Smith, 1991, p. 172).
When Bush asked for an offensive option, the military (Powell and Schwarzko
pf), although reluctant, followed suit, but in order to avoid the piecemeal escalation
of the Vietnam War they demanded a doubling of troops and material (Woodward,
1991, p. 310).
On October 24, Bush and Cheney decided to use force if Iraq would not leave
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Kuwait. Neither the President's decision or authority was questioned within the
administration (Smith, 1991, p. 195). Later on the same day, the Congressional
leadership was briefed again.

It was not revealed that Bush was contemplating

specific offensive actions. Instead, Cheney went public the following day, announcing
reinforcements to "provide a credible option for potential offensive action" (Smith,
1991, pp. 196-197). Very likely the rationale was that if public was supportive
Congress would have no choice.
Bush was convinced that he had the authority to take the nation into war and
made a statement to this effect on October 29. One day later, Bush was pressed by
the Congressional leadership not to take offensive action without approval. The
President stated that he was willing to consult with Congress but declined to commit
himself to seeking advance approval (Smith, 1991, p. 198).
On October 31, Bush signed the presidential order to double the forces of
Central Command. Initially, there was no public announcement, and Congress was
not notified (Woodward, 1991, pp. 311-319); only the allies were informed by Baker
who worked to lay out groundwork for a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing
the use of force (Smith, 1991, p. 199).
On November 8, two days after the Congressional elections, and with high
approval ratings for himself and his policy in the Middle East, Bush announced the
decision to reinforce the Central Command. But even then the number of troops was
understated at first in order to get the public to accept the reinforcements in principle.
At this news conference Bush did not mention that the decision had been made
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earlier. The chairmen of the two Armed Services Committees, Les Aspin (D-WI)and
Sam Nunn (D-GA), had been informed one hour before the conference by Cheney
(Smith, 1991, pp. 201-202). At the time, Congress was not in session, and the new
Congress would not commence until January. Nevertheless, several members uttered
severe criticisms which Bush tried to head off by meeting with two dozen Congres
sional leaders on November 14. After Bush assured them that the administration's
policy had not changed, Congress again concurred but still insisted on the necessity
of Congressional approval of any offensive action. Bush afterwards decided that a
U.N. resolution offered the best solution to question of Congressional authorization
(Smith, 1991, p. 207). An anonymous White House official said to the NYT on
November 20, "Those guys on the Hill aren't going to vote against a war if the U.N.
has already voted for it" (Smith, 1991, p. 212).
Bush's rationale worked. Although Nunn began hearings on U.S. policy in the
Gulf that centered on giving sanctions more time, once the U.N. Security Council
went on record on November 29, authorizing the use of force by January 15, 1991,
Congressional opposition was almost broken. U.N. Resolution 678 left the enforce
ment to the member states, exactly as Bush had wished (Smith, 1991, pp. 216-217).
Bush's November 30 announcement of Baker's peace mission to Baghdad then
fully disarmed Congressional criticism. In the administration everyone was taken by
surprise except for Baker and Scowcroft.

Baker, however, had no mandate to

negotiate, and thus the mission was probably meant to win back domestic support, as
it did. Very likely Saddam Hussein thought that Bush had shown a weakness (Smith,
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1991, pp. 218-219).
Bush's relations with Congress improved, although his request for a blank
check resolution was denied at a meeting with Congressional leaders on November
30. Because of the U.N. resolution, the administration worried even less about its
authority to order U.S. forces into combat. Time magazine reported private statements
of Bush to this effect (Smith, 1991, p. 222).

-·

On December 29, after the end of Nunn's hearings and with the disappearance

.

of Congressional criticisms, Bush authorized Powell to prepare
- for the attack that
would begin January 17, 1991, 3am.

Congress had not been consulted and there

were no plans to obtain Congressional authorization. Accordingly, at a meeting in the
White House on January 1, Bush emphasized his resolve to go ahead without Con
gress to Baker, Cheney, Powell, Scowcroft, and White House Chief of Staff John
Sununu. He said, "If I have to go [to war], it's not going to matter to me if there
isn't one Congressman who supports this, or what happens to public opinion" (Smith,
1991, p. 237). No one objected, the only discussion was how to deal with Congress
tactically. Bush agreed to send Baker to Geneva to meet Aziz on January 9, but no

.. p.
progress was anticipated because there would be no negotiations (Smith, 1991,
238).
At a January 3 meeting with the Congressional leadership Bush again tried to
obtain a broad endorsement for his policies. The leaders again declined. Congress
decided not to adjourn (which was usually done directly after the new Congress
convened in early January) and to go on record with regard to offensive actions. The
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administration reacted to this Congressional assertiveness with increased attempts to
get a favorable outcome, i.e., a resolution authorizing the use of force.

Bush

immediately began to call House and Senate Republicans and personally formulated
a letter requesting Congressional endorsement of the U.N. resolution which he sent
to Speaker Foley, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME), Senate Minority
Leader Robert Dole (R-KS), and House Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-IL) (Smith,
1991, pp. 241-244). Still, Bush asked his advisers for legal opinions on the question
of whether he could he start the war without Congressional approval. His advisers
thought he could, but noted the possibility that Congress could cut the funds
(Woodward, 1991, pp. 357-358).
After the Baker-Aziz talks failed, Baker flew on to Fahd to ask for permission
to launch attack (Smith, 1991, p. 244).
After 3 days of debate, Congress authorized the President to use force
according to the U.N. Resolution 678 on January 13. Bush signed the resolution into
law on the next day but used the opportunity to restate his view of the constitutional
issue:
As I made clear to Congressional leaders at the outset, my request for
Congressional support did not, and my signing of this resolution does
not, constitute any changed in the long standing positions of the
executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to
use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. (Smith, 1991, p. 249)
A last briefing for Congressional leaders before the beginning of the attack
took place on January 14. War seemed inevitable. Bush did not reveal that the initial
order to commence hostilities on January 16 (U.S. Eastern time) had been given
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already (Smith, 1991, p. 255).
The Military Operation
On August 8, the first fighter planes and troops arrived at Saudi bases (Brune,
1993, p. 15). Over the course of the next months, more than 540,000 U.S. and over
200,000 allied troops were deployed to Saudi Arabia. No combat occurred during that
time, except for the actions taken by the U.S. Navy to enforce the U.N. sanctions
against Iraq.
Before "Desert Storm" started it was believed that the Iraqi forces were very
strong and that because of their well entrenched position possibly about 100,000 allied
soldiers would die in the first days of a ground war (Brune, 1993, pp. 94-95). When
Congress debated the authorization of the use of force, it was aware of these high pre
war casualty expectations.
On January 17, 1991, 2:40 A.M. Iraqi time, the allied air attack began with
massive airstrikes and missile attacks on Iraq and the Iraqi troops in Kuwait. Iraq
retaliated by firing its Scud missiles against Israel in order to provoke it to become
involved in the war. Saddam hoped that the Arab states would then leave the
coalition. The U.S. administration applied diplomacy and deployed Patriot missiles
to ensure that Israel would not retaliate. Iraq also set fire to Kuwaiti oil wells, which
caused serious ecological damages. But Saddam Hussein refrained from using
chemical weapons, at least on a broad scale.
After the air attack had devastated Iraqi forces and infrastructure for thirty-
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eight days, the allied forces started their ground attack on February 24.

With

surprising ease the allied forces drove back the Iraqi troops, taking thousands of
prisoners. The ground war lasted only 100 hours. A cease fire was declared by
President Bush on February 28. Iraq accepted the United Nations' cease fire terms
on April 5 (Brune, 1993, pp. 105-120).
The United States suffered 148 combat deaths, 458 combat wounded, and 120
non-combat deaths. 35 deaths and 72 wounded were caused by "friendly fire". The
Iraqi casualties are under dispute: as many as 100,000 Iraqi soldiers may have died,
and 300,000 were likely wounded (Brune, 1993, pp. 121-122; Smith, 1991, p. 9).
Intervening Variables
Throughout the conflict there were Democratic majorities in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate.
After the decision to defend Saudi Arabia was made in early August, support
for the President, as indicated by opinion polls, was overwhelming. His personal
rating went up from 55% before the invasion of Kuwait to 76% by mid-August
(Smith, 1991, p. 162).

A Washington Post-ABC News poll showed that 74%

supported Bush's decision. 60% even thought that ultimately the U.S. and Iraq would
be at war. When asked, however, if the U.S. should invade Iraq, 68% said no, and
only 27% said yes (Smith, 1991, p. 103). These figures indicate that Bush's televised
speech on August 8 and the media campaign had led the public to expect an Iraqi
attack on Saudi Arabia.
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The public, however, was not ready for intervention in August and September.
Yet according to Washington Post-ABC News polls the percentage of those favoring
invasion of Iraq rose from 38% on August 8 to 48% by September 9. By January,
1991, more than two thirds approved of offensive action (Smith, 1991, p. 162). A
majority favoring offensive action if sanctions failed was revealed for the first time
in a November 6 Washington Post-ABC News Poll. At that time the American
people were not informed about the decision to double the troops in the Gulf. 70%
believed that the U.S. would be involved in a war. While two thirds said that Bush
should get Congressional permission, a plurality said they would support the President
if there was not enough time for him to do so. 65% approved of Bush's overall
handling of the crisis (Brune, 1993, p. 94, Smith, 1991, pp. 200-201).
According to Gallup Polls, the shift to a majority for attacking Iraq occurred
later. The November 15-18 poll showed 39% favoring a U.S. invasion to drive the
Iraqis out of Kuwait. Only after the U.N. resolution 678, a December 2 poll showed
that support rose to just over 50%. After that date, support stayed above 50% except
for the December 13-16 polls, when Hussein released the hostages. Opposition
dropped from 50% after the November 15-18 poll and then stayed at 40% (Brune,
1993, pp. 75-76).
Throughout the crisis there was an increasingly intense public debate on the
streets, in the op-ed pages of the national press, and in national television and radio,
with protests coming both from the left and from the right.
Early protests had no significant effect since, as shown above, the general
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public supported economic sanctions and the defense of Saudi Arabia (Brune, 1993,
p. 78). After November 8, however, outspoken protest grew steadily and took various
forms, such as rallies, protest marches, and public discussions (Brune, 1991, pp. 7879). There was considerable open support as well, manifested, among other things,
by the thousands of flags that were flown on American homes.
Intellectual protest came from the left and right.

On the right Patrick

Buchanan, representing isolationist views questioned American interests in the region,
and the libertarian Cato Institute noted that the size of the deployment portended
offensive operations (Smith, 1991, p. 139). On the left, it was notably the outspoken
critic of U.S. foreign policy, Noam Chomsky, who attacked the government for having
supported Saddam Hussein before his invasion of Kuwait (Brune, 1993, pp. 78-85).
It is difficult to assess the impact of such criticism. Bush had to pay more
attention to isolationist Republicans than to the left intellectuals. But the degree to
which he personalized the conflict leads to the assumption that he was not too
concerned about the protests.
The major newspapers and the television media essentially backed the
President in all his policy decisions (Brune, 1993, p. 88). Immediately after the
invasion, when military intervention was not yet an issue within the administration,
the media debated mostly economic sanctions. But just as Congress swung behind
Bush when he announced his decision to react militarily to the crisis by deploying
troops for the defense of Saudi Arabia, so did the media. During the crisis, the
administration followed a policy of minimal candor, and the media failed to ask the
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kind of questions that could have challenged this policy. On two occasions the actual
size of deployments was revealed only because the military insisted on it. Bennet
( 1991, p. 367) noted that journalists rely on politicians who criticize other politicians
and that unfortunately few in Congress (or the administration, for that matter) had the
courage to do this during the Gulf crisis (Bennet, 1991, pp. 355-367).
Congressional Action
Capitol Hill's initial reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was similar to
Bush's. Senator Nunn told reporters on August 2, "I don't think we have a military
obligation at this moment." He said the U.S. should concentrate on diplomacy (Smith,
1991, p. 18).
But just as the National Security Council and the media, Congress immediately
accepted the decision to defend Saudi Arabia. The three leaders who had been briefed
(but not consulted) prior to Bush's announcement supported the President. House
Speaker Foley stated, "Democrats and Republicans, House and Senate...are very
strongly of the opinion that the President had to act" (Smith, 1991, p. 102). Senate
Majority Leader Mitchell said that all Americans would support the President's
decision to deploy troops, and Senate Minority Leader Dole stated that Bush was
doing the right thing by demanding Iraqi retreat. At this time House and Senate had
already adjourned and most members were organizing their campaigns. Support was
not as clear among members of Congress who had not been briefed. Some expressed
concern over the seemingly open-ended commitment. Nunn, who was running for
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reelection, said that a limited engagement would be backed by Congress and that he
hoped it could be confined. Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA), the majority whip,
reminded Americans of the Vietnam experience. Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN),
the chairman of the House subcommittee on the Middle East, emphasized the need for
diplomacy. Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado) said that sanctions should
be given a chance and that she preferred this to be a U.N. rather than a U.S. action.
She said, "This is going to be very costly in blood for anyone on the ground in Saudi
Arabia" (Smith, 1991, pp. 102-103).
After Bush sent the letter that served as a report under the War Powers
Resolution, Senate aides told the Washington Post that Congress would probably
regard it as adequate. And indeed, the only note of caution came from Senator
Clairbome Pell (D-RI), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who
emphasized that Bush must obtain formal Congressional approval in the event of
hostilities. "This is the law," the Senator said (Smith, 1991, p. 109).
The bipartisan mood of support for the defense of Saudi Arabia remained
stable over the following months. Smith (1991, p. 121) noted that including Congress
in the decisionmaking during the early stages of the operation would have made no
difference since it was fully supportive.
However, following the announcement of a possible offensive use of force on
August 18, opposition on the right and left emerged. Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA)
asked why it was the U.S. that always had to act (alone) in crisis situations. Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) stated that U.N. sanctions should be given a chance.

84
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) warned, "If you get involved in a major ground war in
the Saudi desert, I think support will erode significantly. Nor should it be supported.
We cannot even contemplate, in my view, trading American blood for Iraqi blood"
(Smith, 1991, p. 140). When Bush ordered the first fifty thousand reservists to active
duty on August 21, Senator Terry Sanford (D-NC) expressed the first clear opposition
to the President's policy: "We have accomplished our mission," i.e., the defense of
Saudi Arabia. "I would not risk a single life to restore the Kuwaiti royal family or
the throne" (Smith, 1991, p. 140).
Bush regained Congressional support by claiming that the massing of troops
was meant to persuade Saddam to withdraw. After the August 28 briefing Tom Foley
said that no reservations were expressed. House democratic whip William Gray (D
PA) also indicated support, "provided we do not get into a protected struggle with loss
of life and no prospect for victory" (Smith, 1991, p. 143). The question of the War
Powers Resolution was not raised. Most Congressional questions at that point focused
on the costs of the deployment. Bush reacted to these concerns by announcing a plan
of allied assistance on August 30 (Smith, 1991, pp. 143-144).
At a September 21 meeting with key members of Congress Bush outlined
scenarios that could lead to war.

Afterwards, Les Aspin commented that the

administration was "looking more favorably on an early war option" (Smith, 1991, p.
160) and Senator William Cohen (R-ME), the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, indicated that the possible erosion of domestic support
might be a driving factor. "On their way out of the White House, one senator turned
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to several colleagues and asked, 'Is this the briefing that's pointed to later as the one
where they said: We told the Congressional leaders there's going to be shooting?'
His colleagues agreed that it was" (Smith, 1991, p. 160).
Despite this outlook both the House and the Senate passed resolutions at the
end of September that endorsed the administration's actions thus far. In the Senate
only Mark Hatfield (R-OR), Bob Kerrey (D-NE), and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) voted
against the resolution (Smith, 1991, p. 172).
The tensions grew considerably after Saddam declared his resolve not to
compromise. With the prospect of war becoming more real, Senator Mark Hatfield
introduced legislation on October 5 that would require the President to invoke the
WPR or seek specific Congressional approval before sending U.S. troops into combat.
Although the measure was sharply debated, no action was taken (Smith, 1991, pp.
172-173).
On October 17, Baker testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
The Senators expressed concern about a unilateral initiation of hostilities by the
administration.

Chairman Pell even showed Baker a newspaper with headline

"Schewardnadze promises to consult parliament." Baker refuted the criticism by
saying that the President was ready to consult with Congressional leadership but as
commander-in-chief did not need advance approval for the use of force. The Senators
immediately objected, led by Paul Sarbanes (D-MD). Yet Baker repeated his opinion
to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the following day (Smith, 1991, pp. 193194).
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After the public announcement of reinforcements on October 25, the
Congressional leadership was stunned because Cheney had not informed them in a
briefing the day before (Smith, 1991, p. 196). Yet neither chamber took action, not
even when Bush declined to promise to seek Congressional approval for the initiation
of hostilities on October 30. Afterwards, Senator Cohen noted that there obviously
was a difference in opinion about who had the power to start hostilities (Smith, 1991,
p. 198).
With the leadership inactive the Congressional rank and file tried to reassert
Congress's position. On November 20, Representative Ron Dellums (D-CA) and
fifty-three members of Congress, supported by eleven of nation's most respected legal
scholars, sued President Bush in order to restrain him from initiating hostilities
without Congressional approval. Eventually, the district court dismissed the suit on
the basis of ripeness, i.e. the notion that since it was not a majority of Congress that
had sued there had been no constitutional impasse. Judge Harold Greene, however,
also dismissed the administration's arguments that the issue was a non-disputable
political question (Collier, 1994, pp. 29-30).
When the decision to double the troops in the Gulf was announced on
November 8, the reactions on Capitol Hill were more critical of the administration
than ever before during the crisis. William Broomfield (R-MI), the Ranking Minority
Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said:
While the President has taken great pains to consult with the Soviets,
the Syrians, the Egyptians, the Saudis, the French, the Germans, the
British, and many others at the United Nations, his administration has
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failed adequately to consult with the American Congress. (Smith, 1991,
p. 204)
Senator Pell criticized Bush for acting unilaterally and repeated that the
President had no authority to initiate hostilities without clear expression of Congressional support (Smith, 1991, p. 204).
On November 11, the Congressional Democrats finally began questioning the
buildup. Nunn said on CBS's "Face the Nation" that sanctions should be given more
time. He asked what American interests justified a military intervention. Mitchell
emphasized on ABC that only Congress had the right to initiate hostilities. Les Aspin,
although supporting the deployment, agreed. A joint statement by Foley and House
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) read, "We urge the President to explain
fully to the American people the strategy and aims that underlie his decision to
dispatch additional forces to the region" (Smith, 1991, pp. 204-205). On November
12 Senator Moynihan criticized Bush's unilateral action on ABC, "It's as if that great
armed force which was created to fight the Cold War is at the President's own
disposal for any diversion he may wish, no matter what it costs" (Smith, 1991, p.
206). One day later the Senate Democrats then announced joint hearings by the
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. A joint statement by Mitchell,
Pell, and Nunn read, "The President owes the American people the fullest possible
explanation of what our military mission is in that region" (Smith, 1991, pp. 206-207).
Bush again had no difficulty reassuring Congressional leaders. After a meeting
on November 14, Foley said Bush had informed the leadership that the defensive
policy had not changed and that sanctions were not written off. Bush, however,

88
remained intransigent regarding his commander-in-chief powers (Smith, 1991, p. 207).
On November 27, the Senate hearings on U.S. policy in the Gulf began. Nunn
questioned whether military action was wise at his time (Smith, 1991, p. 213). A day
later, Admiral William S. Crowe and General David C. Jones, both former Chairmen
of the JCS, advocated giving sanctions more time (Brune,
1993, p. 89).
"
Perhaps trying to take the edge off the Congressional criticism Bush announced
Baker's mission to Geneva to meet Tariq Aziz. Capitol Hill reacted enthusiasticly to
this opportunity for diplomacy to work. A November 30 meeting with Congressional
leadership went very well until the President asked for a blank check resolution.
Foley insisted, "If you decide to go to war, you'll have to come to Congress," and
Mitchell concurred (Smith, 1991, p. 220).
On December 3, Cheney and Powell went before Nunn's committee. Powell
explained that the doctrine of invincible force required the massive deployments.
Cheney restated the position that the President could initiate hostilities without
advance Congressional approval. With its strongest reaction thus far the House

...
Democratic Caucus passed a resolution on the next day with a 177-37 margin,
declaring that Bush should not initiate hostilities without advance authorization
(Smith, 1991, pp. 226-227).
Yet when Baker testified on December 5, he only repeated the notion of
unilateral executive authority to commit U.S. armed forces to combat. Again, Senator
Sarbanes sharply criticized the administration's rushing the nation into war. Bob
Kerrey (D-NE) stated, "As important as it is for us not to restrict the President's
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ability to threaten the use of force, it is equally important for Congress to represent
the country's hesitancy about using that force" (Smith, 1991, p. 228). Nunn restated
his point about possible future support for military action but questioned whether it
was wise at this time (Smith, 1991, pp. 227-228).
Mitchell and Foley agreed to keep the new 102nd Congress in session after it
convened on January 3 (usually it recessed immediately after this). The leadership
was unsure whether Congress should go on record before the U.N. deadline for
Saddam's withdrawal expired. Mitchell said he believed Bush was just threatening
war to avoid it and that he would not need Congressional approval for this policy.
Through the absence of sustained Congressional criticism after the Senate hearings
were completed and the suit led by Dellums was dismissed, the balance of public
opinion shifted toward the administration (Smith, 1991, p. 231).
On January 3, Bush again tried to get an endorsement from the Congressional
leadership. The Senate Democrats (Mitchell and Nunn), however, were determined
to prevent Bush from going to war without Congressional authorization. Kerrey and
Sanford were against war altogether, and even Bob Dole uttered reservation. Baker's
mission to Geneva again forestalled Congressional opposition. Lee Hamilton said that
this was a new chapter. Bush still did not get an endorsement of his policies without
a "messy debate". In the afternoon, Mitchell urged that no resolutions on the crisis
should be discussed or passed until January 23 (Smith, 1991, p. 240). It should be
kept in mind that nobody in Congress knew about the decision to start war on January
16.
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On the following day Mitchell was pressured to put the Gulf crisis on the
agenda for January 10. Even Dole supported the move. On this occasion, Senator
Tom Harkin (D-IA) gave a remarkable speech which reflected very well the dynamics
of initiating hostilities. He said that a resolution was necessary because Congress had
to take a position under the Constitution to exert its constitutional mandate. He was
aware that many in Congress in previous times had been glad to shift that responsibil
ity to the President. It was crucial to act before "the bullets start flying" since then
a different dynamic would take place, namely a tendency to rally around the flag
(Sifry & Cerf, 1991, pp. 260-264).
Two days later, Foley indicated that the House would also debate and vote on
the issue before the U.N. deadline expired. On ABC, Foley said he thought the House
would narrowly support Bush. Personally he opposed an authorization (Smith, 1991,
pp. 240-241).
When the Congressional debate began on January 10 two separate resolutions
were introduced in both House and Senate. In the House, Gephardt and Hamilton
proposed to stay with sanctions. So did Nunn and Mitchell in the Senate, including,
however, an explicit reference to the exclusive authority of Congress to declare war.
The administration's measure, which authorized the President "to use United States
Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678" (Smith,
1991, p. 245) to liberate Kuwait, was introduced in the House by Stephen Solarz (D
NY), the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Dante Fascell (D-FL) and
Minority Leader Robert Michel, and in the Senate by John Warner (R-VA), Ranking
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Minority Member in the Senate Armed Services Committee. The resolution provided
explicit statutory authorization as required by the War Powers Resolution. As Fascell
put it, it was a "practical equivalent of a declaration of war" (Smith, 1991, p. 245).
In the debate Nunn focused on two arguments. First, he said the interests that
were at stake were not vital enough, and second, sanctions could work. Senator Paul
Wellstone (D-MN) then placed a more emotional appeal in favor of sanctions (Brune,
1993, p. 96). Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) argued that Congressional unity would
maximize pressure on Saddam, thus making war unnecessary. Robert Michel, as well
as many others, used the Hitler-Munich analogy and the alleged atrocities of Iraqis in
Kuwait to justify the use of force (Brune, 1993, pp. 97-98).
On behalf of the administration, the Committee for Peace and Security in the
Gulf, a bipartisan coalition including Stephen Solarz, a Democratic Representative
from New York, tried to outnumber the strong faction behind Sam Nunn.

The

Committee not only proposed the liberation of Kuwait but also the destruction of
Iraq's military and industrial power (Brune, 1993, p. 88; Sifry & Cerf, 1991, pp. 269283). The American Israel Public Affairs Committee and defense contractors also
backed the President, in the end, however, most members voted their conscience.
Even the Jewish members were divided.
The opposition did not principally question whether force should be used, this
matter had been settled by Nunn earlier, but concentrated on the timing. Kennedy
emphasized the "lack of any rational necessity for waging" the war at that time
(Smith, 1991, p. 246).
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Partisan connotations were few. Moynihan accused Bush of moving secretly
"to create the ongoing permanent Orwellian crisis," and Dole countered that some of
the Democrat's strategy appears to be to "get George Bush out of the White House"
rather than Saddam out of Kuwait (Smith, 1991, p. 247).
On January 12, the count in the House was ·183-250 against the Gephardt
Hamiliton resolution, and 250-183 for the authorization-of the use of force. Eighty
three Democrats and only three Republicans crossed party lines. In the Senate where
each name was called to cast the vote, a rare procedure, Nunn's measure was defeated
46-53 and the administration won with 52-47. Two Republican senators, Hatfield
(OR) and Grassley (IA), voted against the President and ten Democrats voted in favor.
There was no celebration after the vote (Smith, 1991, pp. 244-248), which was the
closest margin of support for a war since the declaration of war against England in
1812.

The difference was that in 1991 the opponents ceased to criticize the

administration after their defeat, and backed the President (Brune, 1993, pp. 98-99).
The televised debate had lasted three days. In the House 223 of 435 members
spoke. For the first time in anyone's memory Congress had actually debated the
authorization of the use of force (Brune, 1993, p. 95). A Congressional aide said
later, explaining why so many members had wanted to speak, that the vote was the
most difficult one to cast for a Congressperson. It had not been the most difficult
decision, he said, on the contrary, most members decided without difficulty, but the
members knew that actually casting it was a potential career-killer, either way (Drew,
1991, pp. 189-192).
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After the vote, the mood on Capitol Hill was very anxious. Nobody wanted
to talk about the coming war, but nobody wanted to do business as usual either
(Drew, 1991, p. 193).
A meeting with Bush on January 14 convinced the Congressional leadership
that war was inevitable. Dole said afterwards that there was no hope coming from
Saddam Hussein. Michel said that the tone had been somber. Nunn summed the
mood up, "It's time for America to stand together" (Smith, 1991, pp. 249-250).
After the end of the war Representative Henry Gonzalez (D-TX), who had
vigorously opposed the Gulf war charged President Bush with ignoring the War
Powers Resolution and with bribing allies to get the necessary votes in the Security
Council. Gonzalez, a populist freely swinging between Republicans and Democrats
called for a resolution to impeach George Bush (Conroy, 1991). In the context of the
so called Iraqgate scandal, Gonzalez also accused the administration of knowing that
Iraq had diverted loans. In the same context, and in light of the successful war, many
members of Congress tried to dissociate themselves from any past votes that could
appear soft on Saddam Hussein (Weeks, 1991).
Analytical Summary
Operation "Desert Shield" was a type Ilb case. American armed forces were
deployed in such a manner that an attack on them was possible. Indeed, they were
deployed because such an attack was expected. Operation "Desert Storm" was a
Congressionally authorized initiation of hostilities ordered by the President and thus
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a type III case.
In his relations with Congress President Bush was primarily concerned with
tactics, i.e. how to circumvent meaningful participation by Congress in the decisionm
aking process. He repeatedly did not inform Congress of decisions that he had
.

already made. This confirms the classification of Bush as non-cooperative.
The public broadly supported the deployment of U.S. armed forces to defend
Saudi Arabia. The offensive option found majority support as well but was also
vigorously opposed by a strong minority. The country was strongly divided about the
issue. Since troops had been unilaterally deployed and thus were already there when
the first polls were conducted, a rally effect might have been present from the
beginning.
Given that more than five months passed by from the initial deployment of
troops to the initiation of hostilities, Congress had sufficient time to act.

The

information advantage of the President and his non-cooperative behavior, however,
imposed considerable limitations on the Congress's judgement. Prior to the decision
to go on record before the U.N. deadline expired Congress was partially active.
Individual members made statements, committees conducted hearings, and a lawsuit
against George Bush was brought forward. As for the Congressional leadership there
is a pattern alternating between being rather restraining

and rather supportive

depending upon the President's tactical moves.
The vote to authorize the President to use force constitutes a fully supportive
Congress, especially given the fact that even the initially opposing members indicated
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their support after the vote was taken. It has to be noted, however, that both the
decision to vote at all and the support were reluctant.
Post-hoc evaluation focused on the U.S. policy toward Iraq preceding the
invasion of Kuwait.

CHAPTER VII
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Explanatory Power of Policy-based, Political-based,
and Partisan-based Arguments
What factors account for the different outcomes of the dependent variable,
Congressional behavior in the decisionmaking processes regarding the use of force in
the three cases discussed above?

How do the policy-based, political-based, and

partisan-based arguments relate to each other and to the independent variables
introduced in chapter V? Where are the thresholds between the explanatory power
of the different arguments?
Again, the policy-based argument stresses that a policy-consensus between
Congress and the President can overshadow Congresspersons' concerns about the costs
of a war or warlike action. The political-based argument states that Congresspersons
are reluctant to oppose the President in his decision about the initiation of a war or
warlike action because they fear the political costs that can be involved: opposition
endangers reelection because the public and fellow Congresspersons rally behind the
President in times of crisis (it is probably well known on Capitol Hill that those who
opposed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 were not reelected). In addition, the
political-based argument assumes that Congresspersons want to avoid the responsi
bilities involved in national security decisions. The political-based argument is short96
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term and strongly related to success. Opposition will likely be symbolic. The policy
based argument is long-term but if the basic consensus deteriorates, opposition will
be fundamental. The partisan-based argument is the most clear-cut and long-term.
It simply assumes that members of the President's party will generally back him.
The Indochina case demonstrates both the relevance of the political-based
argument and of the importance of the President's behavior, especially in the initiation
phase.
The political-based motive can explain the partial Congressional restraint in
so far as there was not yet a political cost to be feared from not supporting the
President: the public shared Congress's skeptical view on intervention and the fresh
memory of the Korean war. In addition, because the operation was still in its
planning stage there was not yet a rally-effect. Perhaps most importantly, the
President never clearly asked for an authorization to use force. If Eisenhower had
wanted authorization to intervene and would have employed anticommunist rhetoric,
if he would even have constructed a situation where American soldiers were at risk,
public opinion and Congressional action might have been different. It is not clear
from the historical evidence if Eisenhower was cooperative with Congress because he
believed in the constitutional importance of consultation and Congressional
participation, or because he wanted to divide the responsibility for perhaps "losing
Indochina to communism." The fact of the matter is that the Congressional leadership
did get a chance to express their opinions on intervention. Eisenhower then had to
take the conditions imposed on him by Congress into consideration.
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The policy-motive cannot explain the Congress's partially restraining action
because large majorities of both chambers, all important committees, and the public
shared the administration's anticommunist consensus and could thus be expected to
generally support the administration's policy even if it aimed for intervention. The
partisan-based argument cannot explain the restraining action either. The President's
Republican party had slim majorities in both chambers but the skeptical view on
intervention, especially unilateral intervention, was bipartisan.
The Libya-case also shows the relevance of the political-based explanation and
of the President's behavior, in this instance for a non-restraining Congress. The
Libya-operation is a model case for the rally effect. The airstrikes were supported by
a large majority of Americans and gave President Reagan a boost in his general
approval rating. As indicated by the statements by Senators Leahy and Kennedy,
members of Congress rallied around the flag. While the tendency of not wanting to
be accountable was present among legislators, as manifested by the proposed Anti
Terrorism Act, the operation was too short to provide full evidence for this aspect of
the political-based argument. It was known to Congress that an operation was
planned; thus Congress, at least the leadership, had a chance to act but in this case the
President was non-cooperative and clearly did not want Congress's participation in the
decisionmaking. To force participation in the planning stage of the airstrikes would
have required overcoming a strong resistance on the part of the President. Despite the
strength of the political-based argument and the non-cooperative behavior or the
President, some aspects of the Libya-case point toward a policy-based explanation.
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The concern about international terrorism, the belief that Qaddafi's regime supported
it, and the conviction that the U.S. had to do something about this situation were
common among the legislators and the public. Some members, however, showed
disapproval of the administration's means in dealing with the situation because they
feared a spiral of violence. The fact that even these members in the end voiced their
support for the operation again indicates the importance of the political-based factors.
The Persian Gulf-case shows a strong policy concurrence of both public and
Congress for the administration's early policy of deploying troops for the defense of
Saudi Arabia. Even after the country became sharply divided about the means to
achieve Saddam Hussein's withdrawal, the relevance of the policy-based argument for
Congress's lack of restraint remains high.

Following Nunn's leadership, the

opposition concentrated on the timing of the military operation not on its justification
and rationality in principle. The second type of restraint that was displayed by
Congress, the insistence that the President would have to request Congressional
authorization, also affected more the procedure than the substance of the initiation of
hostilities. For some members, the insistence on Congressional authorization was
essentially a delaying tactic.

Nevertheless, the evidence does not support the

assumption that there were many critics who principally opposed the war but deliber
ately chose this emphasis on a procedural requirement.
Again, as in the two previous cases, the political-based argument can very well
account for the lack of substantial restraint, at least prior to the vote on authorizing
the use of force. With a majority of the American people behind the President's
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policy, there was little incentive for members of Congress to oppose the policy of
achieving an offensive option by continuous reinforcements.

The President also

disguised decisions, delayed disclosure of the number of troops deployed
and their
•
purpose, and used announcements of diplomatic efforts to manipulate both the public
and Congress. Only the high pre-operation estimates of the costs could have offset·
this dynamic, yet they did not. And since the costs of the operation and the number
of U.S. casualties were lower than expected, there was no strong incentive for post
hoc critizism. In fact, critics tried to dissociate themselves from their objections to
a seemingly successful operation.
It has to be emphasized, however, that despite the consensus on policy
objectives (forcing Saddam out of Kuwait) and despite the indications for a rally
effect, the vote on authorizing the President to use force was close. This possibly
reflects the sharp division in the public on the issue, but it also suggests that the
length of the debate decreases the relevance of the political-based argument. An
elaborate debate gives Congress the opportunity to consider the costs and benefits of
a proposed military operation. It gives opponents time to communicate their points
of view and the evidence supporting it to the public. In the Persian Gulf-case, the
eventual narrow support for immediate authorization to use force would then indicate
the strength of the policy-based argument.

However, the vote also showed the

relevance of the partisan-based argument. Republicans voted almost unanimously for
the President. Still, considerable numbers of Democrats crossed party lines to make
support bipartisan. The fact that, prior to the vote, support and opposition was voiced
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from both sides of the aisle (even Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole criticized Bush
at various points) suggests that the vote was more partisan than the issue was.
Implications for a Theory of Congressional Action
in the Decisionmaking Processes
Regarding the Use of Force
Although political-based arguments cannot, on their own, fully account for
Congress's action in the decisionmaking processes regarding the use of force, the
emphasis on the rally-effect that characterizes most of the literature on the subject is
justified. Policy-factors, which can plausibly be assumed as a constant rather than a
variable, at least for the period of the Cold War, do play an important role; yet the
evidence of the three cases suggests that Congress is more concerned with direct
political costs than with the substance of policy.
The question where the threshold between the explanatory power of the two
arguments is cannot be fully answered here. The case studies suggest two points:
First, the longer the debate prior to the military operation is, the less relevant political
factors become. When Congress has the time to consider the costs of a military
action, the available alternatives, and, most importantly, when Congress can make
itself heard in the decisionmaking process, a deliberate decision independent from
assumed or existing rally-effects is more likely than in a pressured crisis situation.
An interesting empirical question in this regard is whether Senators are more
independent of political factors and thus more active than Representatives. Second,
both policy-based and political-based factors can partly be offset by cooperative
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behavior of the President. If the President consults with Congress or Congressional
leaders in a meaningful way, Congress will become more active.
A theory of Congressional action has to take into account that both policy
based and political-based factors are very much overshadowed by the behavior of the
President. His ability to shape the debate in the public and in Congress, to withhold
or disclose information, and to open or close a window of opportunity for Congress
to act cannot be underestimated.
Implications for Liberal International Relations Theory
The analysis of the relevance of the policy-based, political-based, and partisan
based arguments for Congressional action in the decisionmaking processes regarding
the use of force in the cases discussed here suggests fundamental weaknesses of
liberal international relations theory. Congress indeed follows a logic of costs, but of
the political costs that could be caused by opposing the President. Also, the indepen
.,, the
dent judgement of Congress is subject to the superior access of information and

superior possibility of communicating views and shaping opinions by the President.
The greater restraining potential of a democratically elected legislature notwithstand
ing, the institutional power of Congress thus is seriously impaired by factors that are
not inherently characteristics of democracies but rather of government in general.
At least two qualifying points can be made against this conclusion. First, by
adhering to the logic of political costs, Congress essentially reflects the preferences
of the public and thus fulfills its role in the political process. The focus should then
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be on the relationship between the President and the public. Second, since the study
does not include an unsuccessful and/or long and costly military operation, it cannot
draw conclusions about Congressional behavior in these types of cases. However, in
any case liberal theory primarily makes assumptions about the initiation of wars and
warlike actions and says little about their termination ·or about post-hoc actions.
Given the indications that Congress does not assume a strong restraining role
m the initiation of hostilities, perhaps liberal theory has to be reformulated:
Democracies are not less likely than non-democracies to initiate war or warlike
actions. Nevertheless, their internal structure can serve as a check against unsuccess
ful, long, costly, and unpopular military operations. Given the dynamics of executive
legislative relations, the legislature is dependent on the executive's cooperation if it
is to have the chance to consider an operation early enough to take the cost-factors
into account and/or to debate the rationality of the operation and its possible
consequences.
Normative Implications
The prospect of either abandoning liberal theory or modifying it in the fashion
outlined above is not satisfactory from a normative point of view. As democrats we
want democracies to be different from authoritarian states. Neither might nor success
nor low costs should make right.

Yet, democracies have fought unjust wars in

pursuance of their own interests, as the cold war has demonstrated repeatedly.
Nothing indicates that this will be different in the future.
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Liberal theory in its existing form might not accurately describe and explain
democratic warmaking but it still can serve as a prescriptive theory, as it was perhaps
principally meant in the first place. What, then, follows from the liberal prescription
for the political institutions of the United States in the realm of warmaking?
If Congress is to play a more important and more restraining role in the
decisionmaking processes regarding the use of force, it is primarily its will to use the
authority at hand that needs to be strengthened. Congress's legal authority is already
superior to that of other legislatures and does not have to be increased. Enhancing
the resolve of an institution to use its authority (and to assume the responsibility
attached to it) is not an easy task. The policy-based and political-based factors,
which, on the part of Congress, mainly account for the lack of Congressional restraint,
cannot be modified. The factor of presidential behavior toward Congress is thus
likely to be the focal point of any reform. Since the President's behavior cannot be
influenced directly, this brings back the notion of enhancing Congress's legal
authority.
The latest major attempt to compel the President to a more cooperative
behavior, the War Powers Resolution, has not been very successful. But at least it has
been a reminder of Congress's authority, and of the responsibility attached to it, both
for the President and for Congress itself. Although strengthening the WPR would not
necessarily increase Congress's will to enforce it, the institutional will required to
strengthen it would at least suggest a short-term enhancement of Congressional will.
In addition, detailed legislation tends to improve Congress's position in executive-
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legislative relations. Violations of specific points of a detailed law can be criticized
and acted upon easier than violations of a broad and unclear constitutional provision,
like the power to declare war.
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Appendix A

Cases Subject to the War Powers Resolution
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Cases of Required Reporting under the War Powers Resolution 1973-1991
What follows are the instances where the President was obliged to submit a
report to Congress under the War Powers Resolution. The criteria for this compilation
is whether the incident clearly fell under either section 4(a)(l), 4(a)(2), or 4(a)(3).

Year

Location

Event

Report to Congress

1975 Danang

Evacuation of U.S. and
Vietnamese personnel

sec 4(a)(2)

1975

Evacuation of U.S.
citizens

sec 4(a)(2)

Evacuation of U.S.
citizens

sec 4

Cambodia

1975 Vietnam

1975 Cambod. Sea Rescue of the crew of
the S.S. Mayaguez

sec 4(a)(l)

1980 Iran

Attempt to rescue
hostages

no sec cited

1981 Libya

Downing of two
Libyan jets

no report

1982 Sinai

Participation in Multinational Force (MNF)

sec 4(a)(2)

1982 Lebanon

Particip. in MNF: withdrawl of PLO forces

no sec cited

1982 Lebanon

Particip. in MNF:
restoration of
government

no sec cited

1983 Chad

Deployment of AWACS
and ground forces

sec 4

1983 Lebanon

Two Marines killed

sec 4
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1983 Grenada

Intervention with Army
and Marines

no sec cited

1986 Libya

Skirmish with Libyan ships
in the Gulf of Sidra

no statute cited

1986 Libya

Air strikes against
Libya

no statute cited

1987 Pers. Gulf

Firing on Iranian landing
craft

no sec cited

1987 Pers. Gulf

Skirmish with Iranian
vessels

no sec cited

1987 Pers. Gulf

Destruction of Iranian armed
platform

no sec cited

1988 Pers. Gulf

Sinking of Iranian
vessels

no sec cited

1988 Pers. Gulf

Downing of Iranian civil
airliner

no sec cited

1988 Pers. Gulf

Skirmish with
Iranian ships

no sec cited

1989 Mediterr.

Downing of two
Libyan fighters

no report

1989 Panama

Intervention to arrest
M. Noriega

no sec cited

1989 Philippines

Milit. support for
Aquino-government

no report

1990 Liberia

Reinforcement of troops

no statute cited

1990 S. Arabia

Deployment of forces
after Iraqui invasion
in Kuwait

no sec cited

1990 S. Arabia

Continuation of buildup

no statute cited
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1991 Kuwait/Iraq

War against Iraq

no sec cited
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Cases 1973 - 1991 for which the Reporting Requirement is controversial
For the following cases the obligation for the President to report under the War
Powers Resolution is questionable. Thus, they are separated from the cases above.
Year

Location

Event

Report to Congress

1974 Cyprus

Evacuation of U.S. and
foreign citizens

no report

1974 Cambodia

Resupply of forces

no report

1974 Cambodia
1975

Reconnaissance

no report

1976 Lebanon

Evacuation of U.S. and
foreign citizens

no report

1976 Korea

Reinforcement after "treecutting incident"

no report

1978 Zaire

Airlift for French and
Belgian troops

no report

1981 El Salvador

Deployment of military
advisers

no report

1983 Egypt

Deployment of AWACS

no report

1983 Honduras

Military exercises
(until 1988/89)

no report

1984 Pers. Gulf

Logistical support of
Saudi Arabian downing
of Iranian fighters

no report

Enforcement of landing
of Egypt airliner

no report

1985 Egypt/
Sicily
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1986 Bolivia

1987 Pers. Gulf

Deployment of aircraft
and Army personnel
for anti-drug assistance

no report

Escorting of reflagged
Kuwaiti tankers

no report

1988 Panama

Enlargement of troops

no report

1989 Panama

Enlargement of troops

no report

1989 Colombia/
Bolivia/
Peru

Sending of military
advisers for "War on
,
Drugs"

no report

1991 Zaire

Airlift for Belgian and
French troops

no report

(Sources: Blechman, 1990, p. 172; Collier, 1994, pp. 44-51; Franklin, 1987, p. 80;
Turner, 1983, pp. 47-105).

Appendix B
Proposed and Conducted U.S. Military Operations, 1946-1991
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Proposed and Conducted U.S. Military Operations, 1946-1991
Three lists of cases were used to identify these cases: (1) a list compiled by
the Congressional Research Service (Collier, 1993): "Instances of Use of United
States Armed Forces Abroad 1798-1993". It covers uses of force "in situations of
conflict or potential conflict to protect U.S. citizens or promote U.S. interests"
(Collier, 1993, p. l); (2) a list compiled by researchers of the Brookings Institution:
Instances of use of U.S. armed forces "without significant violence to underscore
verbal and diplomatic expressions of American foreign policy (Blechman & Kaplan,
1978, p. 11), and (3) volume I of "Crises in the Twentieth Century", the Handbook
of International Crises (Brecher, 1988) that covers the period from 1929 to 1979. It
measures U.S. activity in 278 crises on the following scale: political, economic,
covert; semi-military (aid or advisors, show of force), military. The cases with semi
military and military activity were singled out, and subjected to further review. Cases
of pure material support were eliminated. For the selection of type I cases Quigley
(1992), Rourke (1983), Rourke (1993), and Tillema (1973) were very helpful.

Type I Cases:
1) Greece, 1946-49.
2) Philippines, 1946-54.
3) Indochina, 1954.
4) Laos, 1959-62.
5) Bay of Pigs, 1961 (overt military operation was considered).
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6) Cyprus, 1963-64.
7) Congo, 1964
8) Six Day War, 1967 (planning of participation in international naval blockade).
Type II cases (Ila: combat followed; lib: no combat followed):
1) Germany, 1948 (Ilb) (U.S. airlift to West Berlin, which was blockaded by the
Soviet Union).
2) Taiwan Straits 1, 1954-55 (Ilb) (evacuation of Tawainese/Chinese nationalist
troops from the Tachen Islands).
3) Taiwan Straits 2, 1958 (Ilb) (Seventh Fleet was deployed in combat area).
4) Cuba/Central America, 1959 (naval mission and ground task force to protect U.S.
citizens).
5) Laos, 1961 (Ilb) (uniformed military advisers).
6) Laos/fhailand, 1962 (Ilb) (deployment of Seventh Fleet in combat area,
deployment of ground forces to Laotian border).
7) Panama, 1964 (Ila) (U.S. forces ordered to secure Canal Zone against anti-Americ
an demonstrators were attacked and opened fire, killing 26 and wounding 100).
8) Congo, 1964 (Ilb) (airlift for Belgian and U.S. paratroopers).
9) Congo, 1967 (lib) (airlifts).
10) Korea, 1976 (Ilb) (Tree-Cutting incident).
11) Shaba II, 1978 (Zaire, Angola) (Ilb) (airlift of foreign troops to the battleground).
12) El Salvador 1981 (unclear) (uniformed advisers in combat)
13) Sinai, 1981-82 (Ilb) (deployment of observers, military personnel, and equipment
to the Multinational Force that monitored Israel's withdrawal from Sinai).
14) Mediterranean, 1981-89 (Ila) (naval exercises in international water claimed by
Libya, downing of Libyan jets in 1981 and 1989, and to skirmish with Libyan
forces in 1986).
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15) Lebanon, 1983 (Ila) (marines helped restoring a Phalange-led government; U.S.
shelled Syrian and Druse positions after being attacked).
16) Chad, 1983 (unclear) (AWACS and fighter planes assisted government in fighting
of revolt).
17) Honduras, 1983-89 (unclear) (War exercises by U.S. armed forces close to the
Nicaraguan border; advisers and non-armed logistical support).
18) Persian Gulf, 1987-88 (Ila) (buildup of naval forces; several skirmishes with
Iranian forces; escorting of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in 1987).
19) Philippines, 1989 (lib) (combat air patrols to help Aquino government against
coup).
20) Persian Gulf, 1990 (llb) ("Desert Shield").
Type III Cases:
1) Korea, 1950-53.
2) Lebanon, 1958.
3) Indonesia, 1958 (U.S. Air Force pilots participated in bombing of positions of
Sukarno government to assist rebels in civil war).
4) Guatemala, 1960 (U.S. Air Force pilots strafed headquarters of Guatemalan
rebels).
5) Cuba, 1962 (Cuban missiles Crisis).
6) Laos, 1964-73.
7) Vietnam, 1964-73.
8) Dominican Republic, 1965.
9) Cambodia, 1969-73.
10) Cambodia, 1975 (rescue of USS Mayaguez).
11) Iran, 1980 (Hostages-crisis).
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12) Grenada, 1983.
13) Libya, 1986 (Air Strikes).
14) Panama I, 1989 (failed U.S. supported coup).
15) Panama II, 1989.
16) Persian Gulf, 1991.

-
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